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Do Alpha Males Deliver Alpha? Facial
Structure and Hedge Funds
Yan Lu and Melvyn Teo⇤
Abstract
Facial structure as encapsulated by facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) maps onto
masculine behaviors in males and may positively relate to testosterone. We find that
high-fWHR hedge fund managers underperform low-fWHR hedge fund managers by
5.83% per year after adjusting for risk. Moreover, funds operated by high-fWHR man-
agers exhibit higher operational risk, su↵er from a greater asset-liability mismatch, and
are more likely to fail. We trace the underperformance to high-fWHR managers’ pref-
erence for lottery-like stocks and reluctance to sell loser stocks. The results are robust
to adjustments for sample selection, marital status, sensation seeking, and manager
race, and suggest that investors should eschew masculine managers.
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1. Introduction
Facial structure as encapsulated by facial width-to-height ratio (henceforth fWHR) – the
bizygomatic width divided by the distance between the brow and the lip – maps onto mas-
culine behavioral traits among males. It has been linked to alpha status (Lefevre et al.,
2014), aggression (Carre´ and McCormick, 2008; Carre´, McCormick, and Mondloch, 2009),
competitiveness (Tsujimura and Banissy, 2013), physical prowess (Zilioli et al., 2015), e↵ec-
tive executive leadership (Wong, Ormiston, and Haselhuhn, 2011), and stronger achievement
drive (Lewis, Lefevre, and Bates, 2012). Does facial structure also have implications for the
performance of investment managers? This important question has received short shrift in
the literature despite the assets managed by investment managers globally as well as the
aggression and competitiveness observed on trading floors (Mallaby, 2010; McDowell, 2010;
Riach and Cutcher, 2014). In this study, we seek to fill this gap by analyzing the relation
between fWHR and investment performance for 2,744 male hedge fund managers over a
22-year sample period.
The hedge fund industry is a compelling laboratory for exploring the implications of
facial structure on investment management. The high-octane and relatively unconstrained
strategies that hedge funds employ, which often involve short sales, leverage, and derivatives
may appeal to high-fWHR managers given their aggressive nature (Carre´ and McCormick,
2008; Carre´, McCormick, and Mondloch, 2009). Some high-fWHR managers may also be
drawn to the industry’s limited transparency and regulatory oversight, which imply oppor-
tunities for deception and unethical behavior (Haselhuhn and Wong, 2012; Geniole et al.,
2014). Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that in the male-dominated hedge fund in-
dustry, attributes associated with fWHR, such as aggression, competitiveness, and physical
prowess, are often synonymous with professional success (Mallaby, 2010).1
1For example, Steve Cohen of SAC Capital and Point72 Asset Management has been described by ex-
employees as a driven, aggressive, and ruthless trader that presides over a “testosterone-charged” trading
floor. See “Inside SAC’s shark tank,” Alpha, 1 March 2010. Julian Robertson of Tiger Management was
tall, confident, and athletic, and hired in his own image. According to Mallaby (2010, page 111), “to thrive
1
Our analysis reveals substantial di↵erences in expected returns, on decile portfolios of
hedge funds sorted by fund manager fWHR, that are unexplained by the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) seven factors. Hedge funds operated by managers with high fWHR underperform
those operated by managers with low fWHR by an economically and statistically significant
5.83% per year (t-statistic = 3.36) after adjusting for risk. The results are not confined to
the smallest funds in our sample and cannot be explained by di↵erences in share restrictions
and illiquidity (Aragon, 2007; Aragon and Strahan, 2012), incentives (Agarwal, Daniel, and
Naik, 2009), fund age (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010), fund size (Berk and Green, 2004),
return smoothing behavior (Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov, 2004), backfill and incubation
bias (Liang, 2000; Fung and Hsieh, 2009; Bhardwaj, Gorton, and Rouwenhorst, 2014), and
manipulation of fund returns (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2011; Aragon and Nanda, 2017).
Why do high-fWHR fund managers underperform? We show that facial structure can
shape trading behavior and lead to sub-optimal decisions. We find that high-fWHR fund
managers trade more frequently, have a stronger preference for lottery-like stocks, and are
more likely to succumb to the disposition e↵ect. These findings are broadly consistent with
prior studies that show that fWHR is associated with aggression (Carre´ and McCormick,
2008; Carre´, McCormick, and Mondloch, 2009) and competitiveness (Tsujimura and Banissy,
2013).2 We show further that, in line with the findings of Barber and Odean (2000, 2001),
Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011), and Odean (1998), the high turnover, preference for
lottery-like stocks, and reluctance to sell loser stocks of high-fWHR managers in turn engen-
der underperformance.
Haselhuhn andWong (2012) and Geniole et al. (2014) show that fWHR predicts unethical
behavior among men. In the hedge fund context, unethical behavior can lead to greater
at Robertson’s Tiger Management, you almost needed the physique; otherwise you would be hard-pressed
to survive the Tiger retreats, which involved vertical hikes and outward bound contests in Idaho’s Sawtooth
Mountains.” The celebrated short-seller, Jim Chanos of Kynikos Associates bench-presses an impressive
300lbs. See “Jim Chanos on bench-pressing, short selling, and the importance of immigration,” Square Mile,
12 October 2017.
2Competitiveness may be related to the disposition e↵ect as competitive individuals could simply hate to
lose and therefore be more averse to losses.
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operational risk. In line with this view, we find that hedge fund managers with high fWHR
are more likely to disclose regulatory actions as well as civil and criminal violations on their
Form ADVs. They are also more likely to terminate their funds, even after controlling for
past performance. Moreover, hedge funds managed by high-fWHR managers exhibit higher
w-Scores, a univariate measure of operational risk (Brown et al., 2009). These results suggest
that high-fWHR managers may be more predisposed to fraud (Dimmock and Gerken, 2012).
We leverage on return data from funds of hedge funds (henceforth FoFs) to show that
hedge fund investors are themselves a↵ected by facial structure and that investors select into
high- versus low-fWHR hedge funds based on their own fWHR levels. In particular, FoFs
operated by managers with high fWHR underperform those operated by managers with low
fWHR by 4.53% per year (t-statistic = 2.27) after adjusting for risk. Moreover, relative
to other FoFs, high-fWHR FoFs load more on high-fWHR hedge funds while low-fWHR
FoFs load more on low-fWHR hedge funds. One view is that the aggressive trading style of
high-fWHR hedge fund managers appeals to high-fWHR investors as it mirrors their own.
These results help us understand how high-fWHR fund managers can raise capital despite
underperforming their competitors and exhibiting greater operational risk.
Given their aggressive and competitive tendencies, high-fWHR managers may take on
excessive liquidity risk relative to the share restrictions that they place on their investors.
The resultant asset-liability mismatch may precipitate asset fire sales and purchases (Coval
and Sta↵ord, 2007) when investors redeem from and subscribe to high-fWHR funds, respec-
tively. In line with this view, we find stronger evidence of asset fire sales and purchases for
funds operated by high-fWHR managers. Specifically, for high-fWHR funds, those that ex-
perience strong inflows subsequently outperform those that experience strong outflows by an
annualized 4.21% (t-statistic = 5.21) in the following month, after adjusting for co-variation
with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. Conversely, for low-fWHR funds, the corresponding
spread in performance is only 1.08% per annum (t-statistic = 0.52). We obtain similar re-
sults with multivariate regressions that feature a full set of controls. Consistent with the fire
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sales and purchases view, the monthly abnormal spread return from the flow sort with high-
fWHR funds is substantially higher when markets are bereft of liquidity than when markets
are flushed with liquidity. In our tests, we proxy for market liquidity with the Pa´stor and
Stambaugh (2003) aggregated liquidity measure. These findings suggest that manager facial
structure may also drive the asset-liability mismatch in hedge funds.
Incentive alignment attenuates the negative relation between facial structure and perfor-
mance, but only when fund managers cannot autonomously influence the alignment mecha-
nism itself. For example, we find that the relation between fWHR and performance is weaker
for funds that are operating closer to their high-water marks, i.e., those with higher manager
total deltas (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009). However, we do not observe a similar e↵ect
for funds with manager co-investment (Brown et al., 2009). This is because high-fWHR
managers, for whom the fWHR-performance relation is strongest, tend to co-invest personal
capital in their funds to aggressively increase their e↵ective pay-performance sensitivity.
Our results are consistent with the masculine behavioral traits that map from fWHR.
What is the underlying biological mechanism that links facial structure to those behavioral
traits? The circulating testosterone hypothesis postulates that fWHR positively relates to
baseline and reactive testosterone levels in men. Consistent with this hypothesis, Lefevre
et al. (2013) show that fWHR has a positive correlation with saliva-assayed testosterone
for men before and after potential mate exposure via a speed-dating event. However, this
hypothesis is still open to debate in the literature. For example, Bird et al. (2016) find in
their meta analysis that there is no significant positive relationship between fWHR and base-
line testosterone or competition-induced testosterone reactivity.3 The pubertal testosterone
hypothesis, on the other hand, posits that fWHR’s association with certain behavioral traits
are tied to testosterone exposure in puberty, rather than to baseline or reactive testosterone
in adulthood (Weston, Friday, and Lio`, 2007). Consistent with this hypothesis, research has
3The dissonance between Bird et al. (2016) and Lefevre et al. (2013) may stem from two factors. First,
Lefevre et al. (2013) analyze testosterone post potential mate exposure while Bird et al. (2016) study
testosterone after competitions that typically involve video games. Second, Lefevre et al. (2013) control for
age and body mass index in their analysis of fWHR and testosterone while Bird et al. (2016) do not.
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shown that testosterone during adolescence influences both craniofacial growth (Verdonck
et al., 1999; Nie, 2005; Lindberg et al., 2005) and the development of neural circuitry (Vigil
et al., 2016). Moreover, Mehta and Beer (2009) provide a neural basis for the e↵ect of
testosterone on behavior. The pubertal testosterone hypothesis has also found support in
the results of Welker, Bird, and Arnocky (2016).4
To investigate whether our findings are driven by testosterone, we redo our baseline
regressions with two alternative biomarkers for salivary testosterone that are documented
by Lefevre et al. (2013): face width-to-lower face height and lower face height-to-whole face
height. Face width-to-lower face height is positively related while lower face height-to-whole
face height is negatively related to testosterone for men.5 We find that managers with higher
values of face width-to-lower face height and smaller values of lower face height-to-whole face
height also underperform. While these results are in keeping with the circulating testosterone
hypothesis given the findings of Lefevre et al. (2013), they may also be consistent with the
pubertal testosterone hypothesis if the aforementioned alternative facial metrics are related
to testosterone exposure during adolescence.
In our work, we carefully consider and rule out several alternative explanations, including
sample selection, marital status (Love, 2010; Roussanov and Savor, 2014), biological age,
limited attention, manager race, barriers to entry, overconfidence (Barber and Odean, 2000;
2001) and fund management company fixed e↵ects. To adjust for sample selection, we
employ the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure with firm strategy flow at inception as the
exclusion restriction and find that the negative relation between fWHR and fund performance
is even stronger after adjusting for possible sample selection bias. Our choice of exclusion
restriction follows Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015) and is robust to alternative
4Welker, Bird, and Arnocky (2016) show that the reason why Hodges-Simeon et al. (2016) find little
evidence that fWHR is related to pubertal testosterone is because Hodges-Simeon et al. (2016) do not control
for age and adopt an excessively liberal criterion for adolescence, i.e., ages 8–22 years. After controlling for
age and limiting the Hodges-Simeon et al. (2016) sample to adolescent males who were between 12–16
years old, Welker, Bird, and Arnocky (2016) document a strong and positive relation between fWHR and
testosterone exposure.
5See Table 2 in Lefevre et al. (2013).
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specifications. Our results are also not driven by sensation seeking. Unlike the sensation
seekers studied in Brown et al. (2018), high-fWHR managers do not take on more financial
risk. More importantly, our baseline results are robust to controlling for sensation seeking via
speeding tickets (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2009) or via sports car ownership (Brown et al.,
2018). These findings are unsurprising given that the behavior drivers for sensation seekers
and high-fWHR males di↵er. Unlike sensation seekers who are motivated by their need for
varied, complex, intense, and novel experiences (Zuckerman, 2007), high-fWHR males are
primarily driven by their aggressive and competitive tendencies.6
The findings in this paper therefore challenge the neoclassical view that manager facial
structure should not matter for fund performance. In doing so, we resonate with work on
hedge fund performance. This literature finds that motivated (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik,
2009), geographically proximate (Teo, 2009), emerging (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010), low R2
(Titman and Tiu, 2011), and distinctive (Sun, Wang, and Zheng, 2012) hedge funds outper-
form, as do those with low volatility of aggregate volatility exposure (Agarwal, Arisoy, and
Naik, 2017). We show that those operated by managers with lower fWHR also outperform.7
We contribute to an emerging literature that examines the impact of facial structure
on financial outcomes.8 It finds that Chief Executive O cers (henceforth CEOs) with high
fWHR deliver higher return on assets (Wong, Ormiston, and Haselhuhn, 2011), are more
likely to engage in financial misreporting (Jia, van Lent, and Zeng, 2014), and take on more
risk (Kamiya, Kim, and Park, 2019). Our results on Form ADV violations echo those of
Jia, van Lent, and Zeng (2014) while our findings on the underperformance of high-fWHR
managers contrast with those of Wong, Ormiston, and Haselhuhn (2011). The dissonance
6For example, to be competitive, high-fWHR male baseball players may spend thousands of hours in
batting cages perfecting their swing. Sensation seekers are more likely to find such an activity prohibitively
monotonous and boring. Conversely, activities such as listening to rock music, partying with stimulating
people, and getting high on drugs are likely to appeal more to sensation seekers than to high-fWHR males.
7Our work is also related to studies on how the personal characteristics of fund managers such as college
SAT scores (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999; Li, Zhang, and Zhao, 2011), relative age (Bai et al, 2019) and Ph.D.
training (Chaudhuri et al, 2019) a↵ect investment performance.
8Our findings also resonate with work by Harlow and Brown (1990), Kuhnen and Knutson (2005), and
Cesarini et al. (2009; 2010) that link biological metrics to financial decision making.
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suggests that fWHR, while helpful for executive leadership, is detrimental to investment
management.9 In a related work, He et al. (2019) find that high-fWHR sell-side analysts in
China make more accurate forecasts. They ascribe their findings to the stronger achievement
drive among high-fWHR analysts. Our results suggest that stronger achievement drive may
be counterproductive when trading in financial markets.
Insofar as fWHR is positively linked to testosterone (Lefevre et al. 2013; Welker, Bird,
and Arnocky, 2016), our findings also relate to work on testosterone and individual in-
vestor trading behavior. Research in this area has shown in experimental settings that high-
testosterone men overbid for assets (Nadler et al., 2018) and take on more risk (Apicella et
al., 2008). In addition, Cronqvist et al. (2016) show that among fraternal twins, females with
higher prenatal testosterone exposure invest more in equities, hold more volatile portfolios,
trade more often, and load more on lottery-like stocks than do females with lower prenatal
testosterone exposure. However, none of these papers investigate investment performance.
Our work is related to Coates and Herbert (2008) and Coates, Gurnell, and Rustichini (2009)
who show that high-testosterone intraday traders outperform. Nonetheless, it is di cult to
generalize their results to investment management given their limited sample sizes (17 and
44 traders, respectively) and the fact that the skills prized in intraday or noise trading, i.e.,
rapid visuomotor scanning abilities and sharp physical reflexes, may not be relevant for the
more analytical forms of trading commonly employed by asset managers.10 Moreover, they
do not control for risk in their analysis of investment performance. Our results suggest that
testosterone is less helpful for the more analytical forms of trading that hedge funds gen-
erally engage in. These findings are broadly consistent with those of Reavis and Overman
(2001), van Honk et al. (2004), and Nave et al. (2017) who show in laboratory settings that
testosterone can lead individuals to make irrational risk-reward tradeo↵s.
9In an auxiliary test, we find that the negative relation between fWHR and fund performance is driven
by managers who are Chief Investment O cers and Portfolio Managers, and not by those who are CEOs.
10Unlike the intraday traders in the aforementioned studies, who typically hold their positions for only a
few minutes, sometimes mere seconds, hedge fund managers often take more time to analyze their positions
and hold their trades for weeks, months, and even years (Perold, 2003; Cohen and Sandbulte, 2006).
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2. Data and methodology
We evaluate the relation between manager facial structure and hedge fund performance using
monthly net-of-fee returns and assets under management (henceforth AUM) data of live and
dead hedge funds reported in the Lipper TASS, Morningstar, Hedge Fund Research (hence-
forth HFR), and BarclayHedge data sets from January 1990 to December 2015. Because
TASS, Morningstar, HFR, and BarclayHedge started distributing their data in 1994, the
data sets do not contain information on funds that died before January 1994. This gives rise
to survivorship bias. We mitigate this bias by focusing on data from January 1994 onward.
In our fund universe, we have a total of 49,672 hedge funds, of which 28,810 are live
funds and 20,862 are dead funds. However, due to concerns that funds with multiple share
classes could cloud the analysis, we exclude duplicate share classes from the sample. This
leaves a total of 26,945 hedge funds, of which 16,929 are live funds and 10,016 are dead
funds. The funds are roughly evenly split between Lipper TASS, Morningstar, HFR, and
BarclayHedge. While 6,652 funds appear in multiple databases, many funds belong to only
one database. Specifically, there are 6,594, 3,267, 5,221, and 4,578 funds unique to the Lipper
TASS, Morningstar, HFR, and BarclayHedge databases, respectively. This highlights the
advantage of obtaining data from more than one source.
For each male manager in the combined database, we use manager first name, manager
last name, and fund management company name to perform a Google image search for the
manager’s facial picture or pictures. If we find more than one picture of the manager, we
identify the best photograph in terms of resolution, whether the manager is forward facing,
and whether he has a neutral expression. We follow Carre´ and McCormick (2008) and
manually measure fWHR using the ImageJ software provided by the National Institute of
Health (Rasband, 2018). As per Carre´ and McCormick (2008), we define the measure as the
distance between the two zygions (bizygomatic width) relative to the distance between the
8
upper lip and the midpoint of the inner ends of the eyebrows (height of the upper face).11
Measurement error can creep into the computation of fWHR if the manager is smiling
broadly, not fully forward facing, or has significant facial adiposity, i.e., fat. It is comforting
to note that our baseline results are robust to excluding photographs of managers who smile
broadly, are not fully forward facing, or have significant facial adiposity. See Panels A, B,
and C in Table A1 of the Internet Appendix.
In total, we are able to obtain valid photos and compute fWHRs for 2,744 male fund
managers. These managers operate 3,152 hedge funds and belong to 1,633 fund management
companies. We define fund fWHR as the average fWHR of the managers running a hedge
fund. In this study, we use fund fWHR as a proxy of the level of manager fWHR associated
with a hedge fund.12 One concern is that the performance of the funds with manager photos
may di↵er significantly from those of funds without manager photos. To allay such concerns,
we compute the di↵erence in average monthly returns between funds with manager photos
and funds without manager photos. We find that the performance spread is economically
modest at –0.01% per month and is statistically indistinguishable from zero at the 10% level.
Following Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), we classify funds into four broad investment
styles: Security Selection, Multi-process, Directional Trader, and Relative Value. Security
Selection funds take long and short positions in undervalued and overvalued securities, re-
spectively. Usually, they take positions in equity markets. Multi-process funds employ
multiple strategies that take advantage of significant events, such as spin-o↵s, mergers and
acquisitions, bankruptcy reorganizations, recapitalizations, and share buybacks. Directional
Trader funds bet on the direction of market prices of currencies, commodities, equities,
and bonds in the futures and cash markets. Relative Value funds take positions on spread
relations between prices of financial assets and aim to minimize market exposure.
11See Fig. 1 in Carre´ and McCormick (2008). Some researchers (Lefevre et al., 2013; Jia, van Lent, and
Zeng, 2014) measure the height of the upper face as the distance between the upper lip and the top of the
eyelids. The advantage of our approach is that it better measures facial bone structure.
12Our results are robust when we analyze only hedge funds with one manager. In those cases, fund fWHR
equals manager fWHR.
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Table 1 reports the distribution of hedge fund manager fWHR and hedge fund fWHR
by investment strategy. The average manager fWHR is 1.823 with a standard deviation of
0.165. Similarly, the average fund fWHR is 1.825 with a standard deviation of 0.150. We
observe little evidence that high-fWHR hedge fund managers gravitate to specific investment
styles. The average fWHR in our hedge fund manager sample agrees well with that found in
the prior literature. For example, Carre´ and McCormick (2008) report an average fWHR of
1.860 for their sample of 37 male undergraduates. See their Table 1. We also note that the
hedge fund managers in our sample have lower fWHRs than do public company CEOs. For
example, Jia, van Lent, and Zeng (2014) report an average CEO fWHR of 2.013 (standard
deviation = 0.149) while Kamiya, Kim, and Park (2019) report an average CEO fWHR of
2.014 (standard deviation = 0.154). This provides prima facie evidence that a higher fWHR
may be less beneficial for fund managers than it is for firm CEOs.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Hedge fund data are susceptible to many biases (Fung and Hsieh, 2009). These biases
stem from the fact that inclusion in hedge fund databases is voluntary. As a result, there
is a self-selection bias. For instance, when a fund is listed on a database, it often includes
data prior to the listing date. Because successful funds have a strong incentive to list and
attract capital, these backfilled returns tend to be higher than the non-backfilled returns. To
alleviate concerns about backfill bias raised by Bhardwaj, Gorton, and Rouwenhorst (2014)
and others, we rerun the tests after removing all return observations that have been backfilled
prior to the fund listing date.
Throughout this paper, we model the risk of hedge funds using the Fung and Hsieh (2004)
seven-factor model. The Fung and Hsieh factors are the excess return on the Standard and
Poor’s (S&P) 500 index (SNPMRF); a small minus big factor (SCMLC) constructed as the
di↵erence between the Russell 2000 and S&P 500 stock indexes; the yield spread of the
U.S. ten-year Treasury bond over the three-month Treasury bill, adjusted for duration of
the ten-year bond (BD10RET); the change in the credit spread of Moody’s BAA bond over
10
the ten-year Treasury bond, also appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY); and the
excess returns on portfolios of lookback straddle options on currencies (PTFSFX), commodi-
ties (PTFSCOM), and bonds (PTFSBD), which are constructed to replicate the maximum
possible return from trend-following strategies on their respective underlying assets.13 Fung
and Hsieh (2004) show that these seven factors have considerable explanatory power on
aggregate hedge fund returns.
3. Empirical results
3.1. Fund performance
To begin, we test for di↵erences in risk-adjusted performance of funds sorted by fund fWHR.
Every year, starting in January 1994, ten hedge fund portfolios are formed by sorting funds
on the average fWHR of the managers managing the fund, i.e., fund fWHR. The post-
formation returns on these ten portfolios over the next 12 months are linked across years
to form a single return series for each portfolio. We then evaluate the performance of the
portfolios relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model.
The results, reported in Panel A of Table 2, reveal substantial di↵erences in expected
returns, on the portfolios sorted by fund fWHR, that are unexplained by the Fung and
Hsieh (2004) seven factors. Hedge funds managed by managers with high fWHR under-
perform those managed by managers with low fWHR by an economically and statistically
significant 6.14% per year (t-statistic = 2.23). After adjusting for co-variation with the Fung
and Hsieh (2004) factors, the underperformance decreases marginally to 5.83% per year (t-
statistic = 3.36).14 As in the rest of the paper, we base statistical inferences on White (1980)
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. We note that the average fWHR for the high-
13David Hsieh kindly supplied these risk factors. The trend-following factors can be downloaded from
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/ dah7/DataLibrary/TF-Fac.xls.
14The portfolio sort results are robust to value-weighting the funds within each portfolio. The risk-adjusted
spread for the value-weighted sort is 7.56% per annum (t-statistic = 2.00).
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fWHR funds in Portfolio 1 is 2.12 while that for the low-fWHR funds in Portfolio 10 is 1.61.
Since hedge funds with investor capital below US$50 million may not be relevant for large
institutional investors, we also conduct the portfolio sort on the sample of hedge funds with
at least US$50 million of AUM. The results reported in Panel B of Table 2 indicate that our
findings are not driven by small funds. For funds with at least US$50 million of AUM, the
risk-adjusted outperformance of low-fWHR funds over high-fWHR funds is still economically
and statistically significant at 4.27% per annum (t-statistic = 3.64).
[Insert Table 2 and Fig. 1 here]
Fig. 1 complements the results from Panel A of Table 2. It illustrates the monthly
cumulative abnormal returns (henceforth CARs) from the portfolio of high-fWHR funds
(portfolio 1) and the portfolio of low-fWHR funds (portfolio 10). High-fWHR funds are
those in the top decile based on fund fWHR while low-fWHR funds are those in the bottom
decile based on fund fWHR. CAR is the cumulative di↵erence between a portfolio’s excess
return and its factor loadings (estimated over the entire sample period) multiplied by the
Fung and Hsieh (2004) risk factors. The CARs in Fig. 1 indicate that the high-fWHR fund
portfolio consistently underperforms the low-fWHR fund portfolio over the entire sample
period and suggest that the underperformance of funds managed by high-fWHR managers
is not peculiar to a particular year.
To further test the explanatory power of manager facial structure on fund performance,
we estimate the following pooled OLS regression:
ALPHAim = ↵ +  1FWHRi +  2MGTFEEi +  3PERFFEEi
+  4HWMi +  5LOCKUPi +  6LEV ERAGEi +  7AGEim 1











m + ✏im, (1)
where ALPHA is fund monthly abnormal return after stripping away co-variation with the
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Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, FWHR is fund fWHR or manager fWHR averaged
across the managers in the fund, MGTFEE is management fee, PERFFEE is performance
fee, HWM is high watermark indicator, LOCKUP is lock-up period, LEVERAGE is lever-
age indicator, AGE is fund age since inception, REDEMPTION is redemption period,
log(FUNDSIZE ) is the natural logarithm of fund AUM, STRATEGYDUM is the fund strat-
egy dummy, and YEARDUM is the year dummy. Fund alpha is monthly abnormal return
from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, where the factor loadings are estimated over the
prior 24 months.15 We also estimate the analogous regression on raw monthly fund returns
to ensure that our findings are not artefacts of the risk adjustment methodology. We base
statistical inferences on White (1980) robust standard errors clustered by fund and month.
[Insert Table 3 here]
The results from the regression analysis, reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3,
corroborate the findings from the portfolio sorts. Specifically, the coe cient estimate on
FWHR in the alpha regression reported in column (2) of Table 3 indicates that, controlling
for other factors that could explain fund performance, high-fWHR funds (fWHR = 2.12)
underperform low-fWHR funds (fWHR = 1.61) by 2.30% per annum (t-statistic = 3.35) after
adjusting for risk.16 The results reported in column (1) of Table 3 indicate that inferences
do not change when we estimate the regression on raw returns suggesting that our prior
findings are not driven by our risk adjustment technology. The coe cient estimates on the
control variables accord with the extant literature. Longer redemption periods and lock-up
periods (Aragon, 2007) are associated with superior performance, while fund age (Aggarwal
15Inferences do not change when we use factor loadings estimated over the past 36 months to calculate
alpha instead.
16The dissonance between the underperformance of high-fWHR funds implied by the regression estimates,
i.e., 2.30% per annum, and that implied by the portfolio sort, i.e., 5.83% per annum, can be partly explained
by the smaller underperformance of high-fWHR funds in the second half of the sample period. We show
in Panels D and E of Table A1 of the Internet Appendix that the underperformance of high-fWHR versus
low-fWHR funds in the first half of our sample period is about twice that in the second half of the sample
period. Since there are more fund return observations in the second half of the sample period, this partly
explains the di↵erence between the regression and portfolio sort results.
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and Jorion, 2010) is linked to poorer performance. Consistent with Berk and Green (2004),
size is associated with lower returns.
To check for robustness, we rerun the baseline return and alpha regressions with
FWHR RANK in place of FWHR. The variable FWHR RANK is simply the fund fWHR
fractional rank determined every month based on funds that report returns that month. It
takes values from zero to one. The results reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 indicate
that our baseline findings are robust to alternative specifications.
We also estimate analogous regressions on SHARPE and INFORMATION, where
SHARPE is fund Sharpe ratio or average monthly excess returns divided by standard devi-
ation of monthly returns over a 24-month period, and INFORMATION is fund information
ratio or average monthly abnormal returns divided by standard deviation of fund residuals
over a 24-month period. Fund abnormal returns and residuals are determined relative to
the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model. Both SHARPE and INFORMATION are computed for
all nonoverlapping 24-month periods post fund inception. We base statistical inferences on
robust standard errors that are clustered by fund. An advantage of analyzing fund Sharpe
ratio and information ratio is that, unlike fund alpha, they are invariant to fund leverage.
The results reported in columns (5) to (8) of Table 3 indicate that manager facial width is
associated with lower Sharpe ratios and information ratios. Specifically, high-fWHR funds
(fWHR = 2.12) deliver annualized Sharpe ratios that are 0.65 (t-statistic = 5.87) lower than
do low-fWHR funds (fWHR = 1.61).
3.2. Fund trading behavior
How does manager facial structure engender fund underperformance? One view is that since
fWHR correlates positively with aggression (Carre´ and McCormick, 2008; Carre´, McCormick,
and Mondloch, 2009) and competitiveness (Tsujimura and Banissy, 2013), high-fWHR man-
agers may turn their portfolios over more often, load more on lottery-like stocks, be more
susceptible to the disposition e↵ect, and trade stocks more actively. To the extent that
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competitive individuals are driven primarily by their fear of losing, competitiveness may be
related to the disposition e↵ect. The extant finance literature has shown that higher turnover
(Barber and Odean, 2000; 2001), a preference for lotteries (Kumar, 2009; Bali, Cakici, and
Whitelaw, 2011), and the disposition e↵ect (Odean, 1998) can hurt investment performance.
In this section, we investigate how facial structure can shape manager trading behavior and
thereby influence investment performance.
In that e↵ort, we construct five trading behavior measures from hedge fund 13-F long-
only quarterly stock holdings: TURNOVER, LOTTERY, DISPOSITION, NONSPRATIO,
and ACTIVESHARE. The measure TURNOVER is the annualized turnover of a hedge
fund manager’s stock portfolio. LOTTERY is the maximum daily stock return over the
past month averaged across stocks held by the fund. Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011)
argue that stocks with high maximum daily return over the past month capture investor
preference for lottery-like stocks. DISPOSITION is the di↵erence between the percentage of
gains realized and the percentage of losses realized as per Odean (1998). NONSPRATIO is
the ratio of the number of non-S&P 500 index stocks bought in a quarter to the total number
of new positions in the quarter. ACTIVESHARE is Active Share as defined in Cremers and
Petajisto (2009) relative to the S&P 500. The last two measures capture active trading.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Next, we estimate multivariate regressions on the trading behavior measures with the
set of controls used in Eq. (1). The results reported in Table 4 indicate that fund fWHR is
associated with higher turnover (although the e↵ect is only statistically significant at the 10%
level), a preference for lottery-like stocks, a tendency to succumb to the disposition e↵ect,
and active trading. Do such trading behaviors in turn engender underperformance? To
investigate, we estimate the Eq. (1) performance regressions but with the trading behavior
measures computed in the previous quarter in place of FWHR. We find in results reported
in Table A2 of the Internet Appendix that consistent with the findings of Barber and Odean
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(2000), Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011), and Odean (1998), such trading behavior is
associated with poorer investment performance.17
3.3. Fund operational risk
The extant literature has shown that fWHR predicts unethical behavior in men (Haselhuhn
and Wong, 2012; Geniole et al., 2014). In the hedge fund context, unethical behavior can
manifest as increased operational risk. In this section, we explore di↵erences between the
operational risk attributes of fund managers with high versus low fWHR by analyzing the
cross-sectional determinants of fund termination and other operational risk metrics.
Our analysis of fund termination is motivated by Brown et al. (2009) who find that
operational risk is even more significant than financial risk in explaining fund failure. To
explore the relation between manager facial structure and fund termination, we estimate a
multivariate logit regression on an indicator variable for fund termination with the set of
independent variables used in the Eq. (1) regressions. To ensure that the results are not
driven by the weaker investment performance of high-fWHR funds, we also control for fund
returns averaged over the past 24 months. The indicator variable, TERMINATION, takes
a value of one when a fund stops reporting returns for that month and states that it has
liquidated, and takes a value of zero otherwise. We limit the analysis to TASS and HFR
funds since only TASS and HFR provide the reason for why a fund stopped reporting returns.
[Insert Table 5 here]
The results reported in column (1) of Table 5 indicate that, controlling for past fund
performance and other factors that can explain fund termination, high-fWHR managers are
more likely to terminate their funds. The marginal e↵ect from the logit regression suggests
17The finding that higher ACTIVESHARE is associated with lower future investment performance for
hedge funds di↵ers from those of Cremers and Petajisto (2009) on mutual funds. We note that the relation
between risk-adjusted performance and Active Share is not always robust even for mutual funds. For example,
Busse, Jiang, and Tang (2019) show that the significant relation between Active Share and the Carhart (1997)
four-factor alpha in mutual funds is driven by the characteristic-related component of performance (Daniel
et al., 1997) rather than by fund skill.
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that high-fWHR funds (fWHR = 2.12) are 2.98 percentage points more likely to terminate in
any given year than are low-fWHR funds (fWHR = 1.61).18 These results are economically
meaningful given that the unconditional probability of fund termination in any given year is
6.17%. As a robustness test, we estimate a semi-parametric Cox hazard rate regression on
fund termination. As shown in column (2) of Table 5, inferences remain unchanged when
we model fund survival in this way.
Unethical behavior may lead to deviations from expected standards of business conduct
that could precipitate regulatory action and lawsuits, as well as civil and even criminal
violations. These events are reported as Item 11 disclosures on Form ADV.19 To explore
the relation between fWHR and violations of expected standards of business conduct, we
estimate multivariate logit regressions on an indicator variable for Form ADV violations.
The indicator variable VIOLATION takes a value of one when a fund manager reports on
his Form ADV file that he has been associated with an Item 11 Form ADV disclosure, and a
value of zero otherwise. Form ADV includes disclosure on all regulatory actions taken against
the fund and lawsuits as well as civil and criminal violations linked to the investment advisor
over the past ten years.
Column (3) of Table 5 reports the coe cient estimates and marginal e↵ects from the logit
regression on VIOLATION. The set of independent variables that we employ is analogous
to that used in the baseline Eq. (1) regressions. We find that hedge fund managers with
higher fWHRs are more likely to report on their Form ADVs that they have been associated
with past regulatory, civil, and criminal violations. The coe cient estimate on FWHR is
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The marginal e↵ect indicates that funds
operated by managers with high fWHR (fWHR = 2.12) are 17.39 percentage points more
18The marginal e↵ect reported in column (1) of Table 5 reveals that a one-unit increase in FWHR is
associated with a 0.5 percentage point increase in the probability of termination in any given month or a
100 ⇤ (1  (1  0.005)12) = 5.84 percentage point increase in probability of termination in any given year.
19For a brief period in 2006, all hedge funds domiciled in the United States and meeting certain minimal
conditions had to register as financial advisors and file the necessary Form ADV that provides basic infor-
mation about the operational characteristics of the fund. This requirement was dropped in June 2006, but
since that date, most hedge funds continue to voluntarily file this form, and since the passage of the Dodd
Frank Act all hedge funds with over $100M assets under management are required to file this form.
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likely to report a violation on their Form ADVs than are funds operated by managers with
low fWHR (fWHR = 1.61).
To further investigate the relation between fWHR and operational risk, we compute fund
w-Score, an operational risk instrument derived from fund performance, volatility, age, size,
fee structure, and other fund characteristics that Brown et al. (2009) show is useful for
predicting hedge fund failures.20 Next, we estimate a multivariate regression on OMEGA or
fund w-Score with FWHR as an independent variable. The set of control variables that we
employ is analogous to that used in the baseline Eq. (1) regressions. The results reported
in column (4) of Table 5 support the view that high-fWHR funds exhibit higher w-Scores.
The coe cient estimate on FWHR is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level.
Do high-fWHR hedge funds also take on more investment risk given the link between
fWHR and risk-taking for firm CEOs (Kamiya, Kim, and Park, 2019)? To investigate,
we estimate analogous regressions on fund risk (RISK ), idiosyncratic risk (IDIORISK ),
systematic risk (SYSTEMRISK ), and tail risk (TAILRISK ). RISK is standard deviation of
monthly hedge fund returns. IDIORISK is the standard deviation of monthly hedge fund
residuals from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. SYSTEMRISK is the square
root of the di↵erence between the variance of monthly fund returns and that of monthly
fund residuals. TAILRISK is calculated as per Agarwal, Ruenzi, and Weigert (2017). The
risk measures are estimated over each nonoverlapping 24-month period post fund inception.
The results reported in Table A3 of the Internet Appendix indicate that unlike the sensation
seekers studied in Brown et al. (2018), high-fWHR hedge fund managers do not take on
more risk. The coe cient estimates on FWHR are statistically indistinguishable from zero
at the 10% level for all measures of investment risk.
20The w-Score is based on a canonical correlation analysis that related a vector of responses from Form ADV
to a vector of fund characteristics in the TASS database, across all hedge funds that registered as investment
advisors in the first quarter of 2006. The fund characteristics used include fund manager personal capital.
See Table 3 in Brown et al. (2009) for the list of TASS fund characteristics used. Since only TASS provides




Why do hedge fund investors subscribe to high-fWHR hedge funds given their lower alphas
and higher operational risk? One view is that hedge fund investors are themselves a↵ected
by facial structure and that investors select into high- versus low-fWHR hedge funds based
on their own fWHR levels. In this section, we investigate this hypothesis by analyzing return
data on funds of hedge funds (FoFs). Our FoF sample includes 573 FoFs managed by 397
male FoF managers for whom we are able to compute fWHRs.
To test whether investors are themselves a↵ected by facial structure, we evaluate di↵er-
ences in risk-adjusted performance of FoFs sorted by fund fWHR. As in the baseline portfolio
sort for hedge funds, every year, starting in January 1994, ten FoF portfolios are formed by
sorting FoFs on the average fWHR of the managers managing the fund. The post-formation
returns on these ten FoF portfolios over the next 12 months are linked across years to form
a single return series for each FoF portfolio. We then evaluate the performance of the FoF
portfolios relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model.
The results, reported in Table 6, reveal substantial di↵erences in expected returns, on
the FoF portfolios sorted by fund fWHR. FoFs managed by managers with high fWHR
underperform those managed by managers with low fWHR by an economically and statis-
tically significant 4.39% per year (t-statistic = 1.97). After adjusting for co-variation with
the factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, the magnitude of the underperformance
increases marginally to 4.53% per year (t-statistic = 2.27). These results indicate that fund
investors are themselves a↵ected by fWHR.
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 here]
To test whether high-fWHR investors gravitate toward high-fWHR hedge fund managers,
we estimate regressions on the excess returns of FoF portfolios sorted by manager fWHR with
excess returns of hedge fund portfolios sorted by manager fWHR as independent variables.
Specifically, every January 1st, we stratify FoFs into high-, medium-, and low-fWHR FoFs.
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High- and low-fWHR FoFs are FoFs in the top 30th and bottom 30th percentiles, respectively,
based on fund fWHR. Medium-fWHR FoFs are FoFs with fund fWHR that lie above the
30th percentile and below the 70th percentile. High-, medium- and low-fWHR hedge funds
are defined analogously. Next, we estimate time-series regressions on the excess returns from
these FoF portfolios with the excess returns of these hedge fund portfolios as independent
variables.21
The results reported in Panel A of Table 7 are consistent with the view that investors
select into high- versus low-fWHR hedge funds based on their own fWHR levels. Relative to
other hedge funds, high-fWHR FoFs load more on high-fWHR hedge funds. Similarly, rela-
tive to other hedge funds, low-fWHR FoFs load more on low-fWHR hedge funds. Moreover,
high-fWHR FoFs load more on high-fWHR hedge funds and less on low-fWHR hedge funds
than do low-fWHR FoFs. The loading on the high-fWHR hedge fund portfolio for the high-
versus low-fWHR FoF spread is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, while
that on the low-fWHR hedge fund portfolio is negative and statistically significant at the
1% level.
One concern is that the results may be driven by the potentially similar risk factor
loadings of high-fWHR FoFs and high-fWHR hedge funds. To address this concern, we
reestimate the time-series regressions after controlling for co-variation with the Fung and
Hsieh (2004) seven factors. The coe cient estimates reported in Panel B of Table 7 indicate
that our results are qualitatively unchanged after accounting for risk.
3.5. Fund asset-liability mismatch
Given their aggressive tendencies, high-fWHR managers may take on too much liquidity risk
relative to the share restrictions that they impose on their investors. On one hand, they may
take on significant liquidity risk to earn the liquidity risk premium (Pa´stor and Stambaugh,
21Our results are robust to re-classifying high- and low-fWHR FoFs as those with fund fWHR in the top
10th and bottom 10th percentiles, respectively.
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2003; Sadka, 2010).22 On the other hand, they may grant favorable redemption terms to their
investors to attract capital. The resultant asset-liability mismatch could translate into fire
sales and purchases when investors redeem and subscribe to such funds (Coval and Sta↵ord,
2007).
To investigate, we follow Teo (2011) and test for di↵erences in the performance of funds
sorted by fund flow last month. Every month, starting in January 1994, ten hedge fund
portfolios are formed by sorting funds on last month fund flow. The post-formation returns
on these ten portfolios during the next month are linked across months to form a single
return series for each portfolio. We then evaluate the performance of the portfolios relative
to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model. The alpha of the spread between portfolio 1 (high flow
funds) and portfolio 10 (low flow funds) represents the dispersion in expected returns, as a
result of di↵erences in flow across hedge funds, that is not captured by exposures to the Fung
and Hsieh (2004) factors. We do this separately for high-fWHR funds and low-fWHR funds,
which are those in the top 30th and bottom 30th fund fWHR percentiles, respectively.
[Insert Table 8 here]
The results reported in Table 8 are consistent with the view that high-fWHR funds are
more susceptible to fire sales and purchases than are low-fWHR funds. For high-fWHR
funds, those that experience strong inflows subsequently outperform those that experience
strong outflows by 4.21% per annum (t-statistic = 5.21) after adjusting for co-variation with
the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. Conversely, for low-fWHR funds, the corresponding
spread in risk-adjusted performance is only 1.08% per annum (t-statistic = 0.52).
The time series variation in the monthly abnormal spread returns from the flow sort
for high-fWHR funds accord with the fire sales and purchases view. When markets are
bereft of liquidity, i.e., when the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) aggregated liquidity measure
falls below its 20th percentile level, the average abnormal spread return is an impressive
22As shown in Panel I of Table 11, our baseline performance results are robust to adjusting for fund
liquidity risk exposure.
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7.60% per annum. When markets are flushed with liquidity, i.e., when the Pa´stor and
Stambaugh (2003) aggregated liquidity measure rises above its 80th percentile level, the
average abnormal spread return is only 0.96% per annum.
To check for robustness, we estimate regressions on hedge fund returns and alphas with
last month flow as well as the control variables from Eq. (1) regressions as independent
variables. We do so separately for high- and low-fWHR funds. In results that are available
upon request, for high-fWHR funds, we find a positive relation between fund flow last month
and fund performance that is statistically significant at the 1% level. For low-fWHR funds,
however, the relation between fund flow last month and fund performance is economically
modest and statistically indistinguishable from zero at the 10% level. Further, when we
estimate analogous regressions on fund alpha with both high- and low-fWHR hedge funds
and include a dummy for high-fWHR funds as well as the interaction of the dummy with
fund flow last month, we find that the coe cient estimate on the interaction variable is
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. Collectively, these findings suggest that
manager facial structure may drive the asset-liability mismatch in hedge funds.
3.6. Fund incentive alignment
Does incentive alignment ameliorate the e↵ect of fWHR on fund performance? To the
extent that high-fWHR managers are self-aware, greater incentive alignment should curb
the suboptimal trading behavior of high-fWHR fund managers. However, funds with greater
incentive alignment, e.g., those where the managers co-invest personal capital, tend also
to have higher powered incentives, which may appeal to aggressive, high-fWHR managers.
Insofar as these high-fWHR managers can autonomously increase their pay-performance
sensitivity, e.g., by co-investing personal capital, funds with greater incentive alignment will
also tend to be managed by managers with higher fWHR. In the presence of this endogeneity
e↵ect, incentive alignment may not dampen the e↵ect of fWHR on performance, especially
if the negative relation between fWHR and performance is stronger for high-fWHR funds.
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In this section, we investigate the e↵ects of incentive alignment on the underperformance
associated with fWHR by exploring two incentive alignment channels: (i) manager total
delta and (ii) personal capital. Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) argue that funds with
higher manager total deltas, i.e., those that are operating closer to their high-water marks,
are more motivated and therefore tend to outperform. How close a fund is to its high-water
mark is dependent on fund performance and the timing of capital inflows, and cannot be
easily manipulated by the fund manager. Therefore, as an incentive alignment tool, manager
total delta is less a↵ected by endogeneity concerns.
To evaluate the e↵ect of manager total delta on the relation between fWHR and perfor-
mance, each year we sort the sample of hedge funds based on manager total delta at the
end of the previous year. We classify funds in the top and bottom 30th percentiles based
on manager total delta as high- and low-manager total delta funds, respectively. Next, we
rerun our baseline performance regressions on these two groups of funds. The results re-
ported in columns (1) to (4) of Table 9 indicate that incentive alignment ameliorates the
impact of fWHR on performance when endogeneity e↵ects are minimal. The coe cient es-
timates on FWHR is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for funds with
low manager total deltas but is statistically indistinguishable from zero for funds with high
manager total deltas.23 In addition, when we estimate analogous regressions on both high-
and low-manager total delta funds and include a dummy for high-manager total delta funds
as well as the interaction of the dummy with FWHR, we find that the coe cient estimate
on the interaction variable is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level.
[Insert Table 9 here]
Personal capital, as an incentive alignment mechanism, is susceptible to the endogene-
ity concerns described above. High-fWHR fund managers may co-invest personal capital
to aggressively increase their pay-performance sensitivity. Consistent with this view, we
find in results reported in columns (5) to (8) of Table 9 that the relation between fund
23We obtain qualitatively similar results with manager option deltas.
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performance and fWHR is stronger for funds with personal capital than for funds without
personal capital. For funds with personal capital, the coe cient estimates on FWHR are
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. Conversely, for funds without personal
capital, they are statistically unreliable. Therefore, in this case, incentive alignment fails to
weaken the association between fWHR and fund performance. We find in unreported results
that these findings can be traced to the fact that funds with personal capital tend also to
have higher fWHR. Collectively, the findings suggest that incentive alignment attenuates the
fWHR-performance relation, but only when fund managers cannot autonomously shape the
incentive mechanism itself.
4. Alternative explanations
Sample selection may cloud inferences from our results. If the availability of manager images
on the Internet is positively correlated with investment ability for low-fWHR managers but
not for high-fWHR managers, this may explain why we find that for managers with available
images, fWHR is negatively associated with performance. In general, the coe cients in
Table 3 that supposedly explain the variation in fund performance could be contaminated
by correlation between the residuals in those cross-sectional regressions and the unobserved
factors that shape the availability of fund manager images. To address these issues, we
employ the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure to correct for possible sample selection
bias. To apply this procedure, we first estimate a probit regression on the entire universe
of hedge funds to determine the factors underlying selection. The inverse Mills ratio is
then computed from this first stage probit and incorporated into the regressions on fund
performance to correct for selection bias.
To implement the Heckman correction, a critical identifying assumption is that some
variables explain selection but not performance. If there is no such exclusion restriction,
the model is identified by only distributional assumptions about the residuals, which could
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lead to problems in estimating the model parameters. The exclusion restriction that we
employ is firm strategy flow at founding, which is motivated by the Asker, Farre-Mensa,
and Ljungqvist (2015) choice of venture capital supply at founding to instrument for firm
listing status. Firm strategy flow at founding is the strategy flow of the first fund conceived
by the firm in the firm inception year. Managers of funds in firms that engage in popular
strategies at inception may garner greater media attention. Therefore, it is more likely that
their facial images will be available via an Internet search. At the same time, it is unlikely
that, controlling for other fund attributes such as fund size, strategy flow at firm inception
significantly explains future fund performance. Indeed, the strategy used to determine firm
strategy flow at inception, may di↵er from the strategy employed by the follow-on funds,
i.e., non-first funds, launched by the firm, further motivating the exclusion restriction. To
further ensure that firm strategy flow at inception does not explain fund performance, we
exclude fund returns reported within a year of firm inception.
Therefore, to correct for sample selection, we first estimate a probit regression on the
probability that the manager facial image is available with firm strategy flow at inception as
the independent variable. In line with our intuition, the coe cient estimate on firm strategy
flow at inception in the selection equation, reported in column (3) of Table 10, is positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level. The estimates from the second stage regressions
reported in columns (4) and (5) of Table 10 indicate that our findings are even stronger
after controlling for sample selection. For robustness, we consider alternative exclusion
restrictions such as firm strategy flow in the 24-month period prior to firm inception or
the logarithm of firm inception AUM. The results reported in Panels F and G of Table A1
of the Internet Appendix indicate that our sample selection adjusted results are robust to
alternative specifications.
[Insert Tables 10 and 11 here]
Marital status may drive our findings (Love, 2010; Roussanov and Savor, 2014). If high-
fWHR men are more likely to marry and marriage hurts performance, then this may explain
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why we find that performance is negatively related to fWHR. To control for marital status,
we first merge our data with marriage and divorce data that are publicly available for 13
states in the U.S.24 We are able to obtain marital records for 147 out of the 478 fund managers
that operate in the 13 states. Using those records, we construct an indicator variable for
whether a manager is married or single. We assume that managers who operate in those
states but do not have marital records are single. The results from the baseline performance
regressions augmented with the marriage dummy are reported in Panel A of Table 11. They
indicate that inferences remain unchanged after controlling for marital status.25
The results may also be driven by a firm e↵ect. Capable firms may hire low-fWHR
managers while less capable firms may hire high-fWHR managers. Therefore, our baseline
results may be driven by di↵erences in the quality of the firms that hire low- versus high-
fWHR managers as opposed to di↵erences in fund manager skill. To control for this, we
include firm fixed e↵ects in the baseline performance regressions. As shown in Panel B of
Table 11, inferences remain unchanged after this adjustment.
Manager biological age may also drive our results. To account for manager biological age,
we cull information on fund manager date of birth from Peoplewise (www.peoplewise.com),
which is available for about 53.68% of the managers in our sample.26 Next, we rerun the
baseline regressions for this subsample after including an additional independent variable for
manager age. The results reported in Panel C of Table 11 indicate that inferences remain
unchanged with this adjustment.
24The 13 states that publicly disclose marital records are Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia. See Lu, Ray,
and Teo (2016) for more information on the data.
25To address concerns that high-fWHR managers are more likely to get married and divorced, and that
marital events distract fund managers from their investment duties (Lu, Ray, and Teo, 2016), we remove
returns reported during the six-month period around each marriage and divorce from the sample of fund
managers in the 13 states and redo the baseline regressions. We find that the baseline findings are virtually
unchanged with this adjustment suggesting that limited attention does not drive our results.
26We find that high- and low-fWHR managers are on average 43.7 and 42.9 years old, respectively. The
biological age di↵erence is statistically indistinguishable from zero at the 10% level. While it is well estab-
lished that testosterone decreases in men after age 40 (Feldman et al., 2002), our results do not necessarily
imply that performance also improves with age since old age is associated with other changes including a
potential loss of mental acuity (Peters, 2006).
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According to Campbell et al. (2010) for young men between ages 18 to 23 years, one of
the four aspects of sensation seeking, i.e., boredom susceptibility, may be related to salivary
testosterone. Therefore, insofar as fWHR is related to salivary testosterone, sensation seeking
may be responsible for our findings. To control for sensation seeking, we cull information
on new vehicles purchased by hedge fund managers from 2006 to 2012 from vin.place as
per Brown et al. (2018). For the 1,086 funds in the sample with vehicle information, we
construct a sports car indicator variable that takes a value of one if a manager in the fund
purchased a sports car, and a value of zero otherwise. Brown et al. (2018) argue that
sensation seekers are more likely to purchase sports cars than are nonsensation seekers. The
coe cient estimates from the baseline performance regressions with this additional control
variable are reported in Panel D of Table 11 and suggest that sensation seeking does not
drive our findings. In an alternative test, we follow Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) and
control for sensation seeking by including an additional independent variable based on the
number of speeding tickets incurred by each manager. The results reported in Panel H of
Table A1 in the Internet Appendix indicate that the baseline regression results are robust
to controlling for sensation seeking this way.
Managers who do not look the part may face greater di culties raising capital. Popular
stereotypes of successful investment managers may lead investors to believe that high-fWHR
managers are more likely to succeed. Hence, our findings may be driven by the greater
barriers to entry that low-fWHR fund managers face. To test, we compute the correlation
between fund inception AUM and fund fWHR. We find that the correlation while positive
is economically modest, i.e., at 0.0171, and statistically unreliable, casting doubt on the
barriers to entry view. To investigate further, we sort hedge funds based on fund strategy
flow during fund inception year. We find that the baseline results are even stronger for funds
launched during years with above-median strategy flow, i.e., when barriers to entry are likely
to be less pertinent. These results cast further doubt on the barriers to entry story.27
27Our results are also not driven by overconfidence (Barber and Odean, 2000; 2001). The results in Panel
I of Table A1 in the Internet Appendix indicate that our baseline findings are robust to controlling for
27
5. Robustness tests
In this section, we conduct a battery of robustness tests to ascertain the strength of our
empirical results.
5.1. Backfill bias
If hedge funds managed by high-fWHR managers are less likely to backfill their returns,
this could explain why we find that they underperform. To address backfill bias concerns,
we rerun the baseline performance regressions after dropping returns reported prior to fund
listing. This necessitates that we limit the fund sample to TASS and HFR since only these
databases provide data on fund listing date. The results reported in Panel E of Table 11
indicate that our findings are not driven by backfill bias.
5.2. Serial correlation in fund returns
Serial correlation in fund returns could arise from linear interpolation of prices for illiquid
and infrequently traded securities or the use of smoothed broker dealer quotes. This could
inflate some of the test statistics that we use to make inferences. To allay such concerns, we
reestimate the baseline regressions after unsmoothing fund returns using the algorithm of
Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004). The results presented in Panel F of Table 11 indicate
that our findings are robust to adjusting for serial correlation in fund returns.
5.3. Fund fees
Hedge fund returns are reported net of fees. If funds with high-fWHR managers charge
higher fees than do funds with low-fWHR managers, this may explain the underperformance
of the former. To derive pre-fee returns, it is important to match each capital outflow to the
excessive trading, which Barber and Odean (2000; 2001) argue positively relates to overconfidence.
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relevant capital inflow when calculating the high-water mark and the performance fee. In
our pre-fee return calculation, we assume as per Appendix A of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik
(2009) that capital leaves the fund on a first-in, first-out basis. The results reported in Panel
G of Table 11 indicate that our findings survive the imputation of fees.
5.4. Omitted risk factors
The presence of additional risk factors could cloud inferences from the fund alpha analysis.
To ameliorate such concerns, we separately augment the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with
an emerging markets factor derived from the MSCI Emerging Markets Index return, with
the out-of-the-money S&P 500 call and put option-based factors from the Agarwal and Naik
(2004) model, and with the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. The results
presented in Panels H, I, and J of Table 11 indicate that our baseline results are not driven
by omitted risk factors. In findings that are available upon request, we find that the baseline
results are robust to augmenting the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with the volatility of
aggregate volatility factor of Agarwal, Arisoy, and Naik (2017).
5.5. Fund termination
There are concerns that because funds that terminated their operations may have stopped
reporting returns prematurely, the fund alphas are biased upward. To allay such concerns,
we assume that, for the month after a fund liquidates, its return is –10%. As shown in Panel
K of Table 11, the baseline results are robust to adjusting for fund termination in this way.




The Fung and Hsieh (2004) model may not adequately capture the risk exposures of the
funds given the heterogeneity in investment styles. Therefore, we rerun the performance
regressions with style-adjusted return and alpha. Fund style-adjusted return is simply the
return of a fund minus the average return of the funds in the same investment style for that
month. Fund style-adjusted alpha is defined analogously. The results reported in Panel L of
Table 11 indicate that the baseline findings are robust to adjusting for investment style.
5.7. Extreme fWHR
The sort results in Table 2 suggest that our findings may be driven by funds with high
fWHR. To test, each year we remove from the sample funds with fWHRs that are in the top
10th percentile and reestimate our baseline performance regressions. As shown in Panel M
of Table 11, the coe cient estimates on FWHR in the performance regressions shrink after
omitting the extreme high fund fWHR observations from the sample. Nonetheless, they are
still statistically significant at the 5% level.
5.8. Fund performance manipulation
If low-fWHR managers are more likely to inflate the returns that they report to commercial
databases than are high-fWHR managers, this may explain why we find that high-fWHR
managers underperform. To address such concerns, we rerun our baseline regressions with
returns computed from Thomson Financial 13-F long-only filings that are reported to the
SEC. Since these holdings are reported to the SEC, they are more costly to manipulate. The
results reported in Panel N of Table 11 indicate that our findings are not driven by fund
manager manipulation of reported fund returns.
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5.9. Manager race
If fWHR varies systematically by manager race, our baseline findings may capture a race
fixed e↵ect instead. Since the overwhelming majority of our managers are Caucasians (2,709
out of the 2,744 managers), to address this concern, we reestimate the baseline regressions
for this group of managers. The results reported in Panel O of Table 11 indicate that our
findings are not driven by fund manager race.
5.10. Alternative facial metrics
Lefevre et al. (2013) report that face width-to-lower face height (henceforth fWLHR) is pos-
itively related while lower face height-to-whole face height (henceforth LHWH) is negatively
related to testosterone for men post potential mate exposure via a speed-dating event. Lower
face height is the vertical distance between the highest point of the eyelids and the bottom
of the chin. Whole face height is the vertical distance between the top of the forehead and
the bottom of the chin. See their Table 2. To further test the testosterone view, we compute
fWLHR and LHWH for the managers in our sample and reestimate the baseline regressions
with fWLHR or LHWH in place of fWHR. The results reported in Panels P and Q of Table
11 suggest that our findings are qualitatively unchanged with these alternative biomarkers
for testosterone.
5.11. Female fund managers
The literature finds that fWHR better predicts outcomes for men than for women (Carre´
and McCormick, 2008; Carre´, McCormick, and Mondloch, 2009). For example, Carre´ and
McCormick (2008) find that fWHR predicts aggressiveness in males but not in females.
Moreover, Lefevre et al. (2013) argue that because women have higher levels of oestrogen
and growth hormone, which can also influence bone growth (Juul, 2001), facial morphology
in men and women likely reflects di↵erent growth and endocrine mechanisms and is thus not
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easily comparable. Nonetheless, we compute fWHR for the 67 female managers in our hedge
fund sample with valid photos. Next we rerun our baseline regressions with both male and
female fund managers. The results reported in Panel R of Table 11 indicate that our findings
are robust to including females in the sample. As a placebo test, we reestimate the baseline
regressions with only female fund managers. Consistent with Carre´ and McCormick (2008),
we find in results that are available upon request that fWHR is not related to performance
among female hedge fund managers.
5.12. Manager roles
If the findings are driven by the relation between facial structure and investment manage-
ment, our results should be stronger for managers who are primarily responsible for the
investment activities at their funds. Moreover, it is important to square our findings with
those of Wong, Ormiston, and Haselhuhn (2011) who show that higher fWHR maps to ef-
fective executive leadership. In that e↵ort, we split the fund managers in our sample into
Chief Investment O cers/Portfolio Managers, CEOs, and Others (Chief Risk O cers, Chief
Operating O cers, etc). Manager role information is available for 2,401 of the 2,744 man-
agers. Next, we redo the baseline regressions with the three groups of managers and report
the findings in Table A4 of the Internet Appendix. Consistent with the view that facial
structure has implications for investment management, the negative relation between fWHR
and fund performance is most pronounced for Chief Investment O cers/Portfolio Managers.
In keeping with the Wong, Ormiston, and Haselhuhn (2011) view, the erstwhile negative




Facial structure as summarized by fWHR positively correlates with a host of benefits. These
benefits include alpha status in Capuchin monkeys, competitive success for professional
Japanese baseball players, superior fighting skills among UFC fighters, e↵ective executive
leadership for firm CEOs, and stronger achievement drive in U.S. presidents. We show
empirically that superior investment performance is not one of those benefits.
We make several contributions to the finance literature. First, we present novel results
on the relation between fWHR and investment performance. Our findings on the underper-
formance of high-fWHR hedge fund managers o↵er fresh insights relative to prior studies
on intraday traders. The results are important in light of the over US$3 trillion of assets
managed by the hedge fund industry and may have implications for investment management
in general.28 Second, we find that high-fWHR managers exhibit greater operational risk,
are more likely to fail even after controlling for past performance, and disclose more regu-
latory, civil, and criminal violations. Investors are not compensated for taking operational
risk. Therefore, these findings are helpful for investors as they seek to minimize operational
risk and avoid fraud. Third, we show that facial structure can underlie behavioral biases
such as the disposition e↵ect. Fourth, our findings on how high-fWHR investors gravitate to
funds operated by high-fWHR managers help us understand why high-fWHR managers can
raise capital despite underperforming their competitors and exhibiting greater operational
risk. Fifth, we show that hedge fund manager facial width is associated with a greater asset-
liability mismatch, which translates into asset fire sales and purchases when investors redeem
from and subscribe to funds, respectively. Sixth, we find that incentive alignment does not
always attenuate the negative relation between facial width and fund performance. This is
because high-fWHR managers often co-invest personal capital in their funds to aggressively
28According to BarclayHedge, hedge funds collectively managed over US$3 trillion in assets in the
third quarter of 2018. See https://www.barclayhedge.com/solutions/assets-under-management/hedge-fund-
assets-under-management/
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increase their e↵ective pay-performance sensitivity.
In the context of the ultra-competitive and male-dominated hedge fund industry, where
masculine traits such as aggression, competitiveness, and drive are encouraged, expected,
and even celebrated, our results on the underperformance of high-fWHR alpha males are
enlightening. They indicate that, contrary to what popular stereotypes of successful invest-
ment managers imply, the masculine behaviors that map from fWHR can be inimical to
investment management. These findings are relevant for investment fiduciaries who allocate
capital to hedge funds as well as for hedge fund personnel who make hiring and sta ng
decisions. The results also underscore the importance of assessing manager facial structure
when conducting operational due diligence in a fund management context.29
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Fig 1. Cumulative abnormal returns of hedge funds managed by high-fWHR managers versus hedge funds managed by low-fWHR managers. Equal-
weighted portfolios of hedge funds are constructed by sorting funds into ten portfolios based on the average manager fWHR for the fund. fWHR is facial
width-to-height ratio. Only male managers are included in the sample. Portfolio 1 is the portfolio of funds with the highest fWHR. Portfolio 10 is the
portfolio of funds with the lowest fWHR. Cumulative abnormal return is the difference between a portfolio’s excess return and its factor loadings multiplied
by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) risk factors. Factor loadings are estimated over the entire sample period. The sample period is from January 1994 to
December 2015. 
Number of observations Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum 25th Percentile 75th Percentile Maximum
Investment strategy (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Manager fWHR
Security Selection managers 1491 1.825 1.821 0.162 1.064 1.714 1.933 2.433
Multi-process managers 410 1.805 1.789 0.172 1.390 1.674 1.916 2.512
Directional Trader managers 479 1.831 1.836 0.159 1.367 1.712 1.938 2.333
Relative Value managers 364 1.826 1.815 0.175 1.282 1.708 1.922 2.558
All managers 2744 1.823 1.816 0.165 1.064 1.708 1.932 2.558
Panel B: Fund fWHR
Security Selection funds 1714 1.826 1.818 0.147 1.064 1.730 1.914 2.417
Multi-process funds 465 1.815 1.806 0.158 1.390 1.697 1.911 2.512
Directional Trader funds 616 1.822 1.810 0.151 1.507 1.717 1.921 2.333
Relative Value funds 357 1.839 1.835 0.151 1.408 1.740 1.926 2.558
All funds 3152 1.825 1.816 0.150 1.064 1.727 1.917 2.558
Table 1
Distribution of hedge fund manager fWHR and hedge fund fWHR by investment strategy
This table reports the distribution of hedge fund manager fWHR and hedge fund fWHR decomposed by investment strategy. The variable hedge fund manager fWHR is
manager facial width-to-height ratio. Following Carre, McCormick, and Mondloch (2009), it is computed as the distance between the two zygions (bizygomatic width)
relative to the distance between the upper lip and the midpoint of the inner ends of the eyebrows (height of the upper face). Fund fWHR is the average fWHR of the
managers managing a hedge fund. The strategy classification follows Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009). Security Selection funds take long and short positions in
undervalued and overvalued securities, respectively. Usually, they take positions in equity markets. Multi-process funds employ multiple strategies that take advantage of
significant events, such as spin-offs, mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy reorganizations, recapitalizations, and share buybacks. Directional Trader funds bet on the
direction of market prices of currencies, commodities, equities, and bonds in the futures and cash markets. Relative Value funds take positions on spread relations between








t -statistic of 
alpha
SNPMRF SCMLC BD10RET BAAMTSY PTFSBD PTFSFX PTFSCOM Adj. R 2
Hedge fund portfolio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Portfolio 1 (high fWHR) 2.97* 2.11 0.41 0.38 0.27** 0.20** -1.31** -2.09** 0.00 0.01* 0.01 0.67
Portfolio 2 4.95** 3.07 1.69 1.67 0.31** 0.27** -0.90* -1.81** -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.76
Portfolio 3 8.01** 5.14 4.86** 4.76 0.32** 0.21** -1.06** -1.28** -0.02** 0.01* 0.00 0.74
Portfolio 4 7.98** 5.51 7.88** 7.29 0.32** 0.09** -0.45 -1.86** -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.74
Portfolio 5 8.14** 4.64 5.68** 6.43 0.32** 0.19** -0.49 -1.95** -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.76
Portfolio 6 8.68** 3.73 6.31** 5.11 0.35** 0.16** -0.32 -2.57** -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.71
Portfolio 7 8.62** 5.79 6.30** 5.66 0.25** 0.19** -0.77* -2.38** -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.66
Portfolio 8 7.31** 4.33 4.87** 5.21 0.26** 0.17** -0.35 -1.56** -0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.67
Portfolio 9 7.67** 2.74 4.97** 3.88 0.33** 0.25** -0.73 -2.55** -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.69
Portfolio 10 (low fWHR) 9.11** 4.09 6.24** 4.59 0.33** 0.27** -0.55 -2.27** -0.02* 0.01 0.00 0.64
Spread (1-10) -6.14* -2.23 -5.83** -3.36 -0.06 -0.07 -0.76 -0.18 0.02* 0.00 0.01 0.03
Portfolio 1 (high fWHR) 1.80 1.57 0.36 0.47 0.19** 0.07** -0.66* -2.40** -0.01** 0.01** -0.00 0.584
Portfolio 2 3.76* 2.35 1.32 1.25 0.27** 0.22** -1.26** -1.77** -0.02** 0.01* -0.01 0.615
Portfolio 3 5.68** 3.57 3.24** 2.98 0.28** 0.19** -1.55** -1.58** -0.02** 0.01 0.00 0.567
Portfolio 4 5.36** 3.80 3.36** 3.72 0.27** 0.11** -1.13** -2.26** -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.605
Portfolio 5 6.71** 4.68 4.68** 5.67 0.24** 0.21** -0.78* -2.54** -0.01* 0.00 0.01 0.691
Portfolio 6 7.56** 4.12 5.16** 4.39 0.29** 0.23** -0.96* -3.38** -0.02** 0.01 -0.00 0.617
Portfolio 7 5.50** 3.85 3.48** 3.58 0.22** 0.18** -1.22** -2.30** -0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.563
Portfolio 8 4.69** 3.69 2.88** 3.22 0.23** 0.14** -0.56 -0.83 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.524
Portfolio 9 6.70** 4.35 5.04** 4.37 0.23** 0.18** -0.61 -2.47** -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.487
Portfolio 10 (low fWHR) 9.47** 4.47 4.63** 4.63 0.38** 0.23** -1.19* -2.59** -0.02** 0.01 0.00 0.608
Spread (1-10) -7.67** 3.18 -4.27** -3.64 -0.19** -0.16 -0.53 -0.19 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02
Table 2
Portfolio sorts on hedge fund manager fWHR
Hedge funds are sorted into ten portfolios based on the average facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) of the managers managing the funds. Only male managers are included in the sample. Hedge
fund portfolio performance is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. The Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors are S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF ), Russell 2000 return
minus S&P 500 return (SCMLC ), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for the duration (BD10RET ), change in the spread of Moody's
BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY ), bond PTFS (PTFSBD ), currency PTFS (PTFSFX ), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM ). The t -statistics 
derived from White (1980) standard errors are in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2015. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Panel A: Full sample of hedge funds
Panel B: Hedge funds with AUM >= US$50m
RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA SHARPE INFORMATION SHARPE INFORMATION
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FWHR -0.529** -0.375** -0.367** -0.725**
(-2.93) (-3.35) (-5.87) (-4.01)
FWHR_RANK -0.246** -0.193** -0.212** -0.366**
(-3.02) (-3.91) (-6.54) (-3.96)
MGTFEE 0.064 0.045 0.064 0.045 0.008 0.24 0.008 0.24
(1.52) (1.27) (1.53) (1.26) (0.37) (1.03) (0.37) (1.04)
PERFFEE -0.004 0.006 -0.004 0.006 -0.001 0.013* -0.001 0.013*
(-0.87) (1.52) (-0.84) (1.55) (-0.34) (1.97) (-0.30) (1.99)
HWM 0.110* 0.115* 0.107* 0.113* 0.002 -0.136 0.002 -0.138
(2.21) (2.31) (2.12) (2.28) (0.06) (-0.91) (0.07) (-0.93)
LOCKUP 0.079 0.030 0.078 0.029 0.026 -0.038 0.024 -0.041
(1.94) (0.83) (1.93) (0.80) (0.97) (-0.93) (0.89) (-1.01)
LEVERAGE 0.027 0.021 0.024 0.020 -0.046 0.008 -0.045 0.007
(0.90) (0.59) (0.78) (0.54) (-1.48) (0.16) (-1.47) (0.14)
AGE -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.001 0.022 -0.001 0.022
(-2.87) (-3.51) (-2.90) (-3.53) (-0.20) (0.83) (-0.24) (0.83)
REDEMPTION 0.015** 0.004 0.015** 0.004 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.004
(3.07) (0.66) (3.11) (0.71) (1.03) (0.49) (1.08) (0.60)
log(FUNDSIZE ) -0.052** -0.001 -0.051** 0.000 0.000 -0.048 0.001 -0.047
(-3.58) (-0.06) (-3.53) (0.01) (-0.02) (-1.06) (0.13) (-1.03)
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.027 0.015 0.027 0.015 0.046 0.016 0.047 0.016
N 150306 111893 150306 111893 5596 5600 5596 5600
Table 3
Multivariate regressions on hedge fund performance
This table reports results from multivariate regressions on hedge fund performance. The dependent variables include hedge fund return (RETURN ), alpha (ALPHA ), Sharpe
ratio (SHARPE ), and information ratio (INFORMATION ). RETURN is the monthly hedge fund net-of-fee return. ALPHA is the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor monthly
alpha where factor loadings are estimated over the last 24 months. SHARPE is the average monthly fund excess returns divided by standard deviation of monthly fund returns.
INFORMATION is the average monthly fund alpha divided by standard deviation of monthly fund residuals from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model. SHARPE and 
INFORMATION are estimated over each nonoverlapping 24-month period after fund inception. The primary independent variable of interest is the average facial width-to-
height ratio of the fund managers in the fund (FWHR ). Only male managers are included in the sample. Another independent variable of interest is FWHR percentile rank
(FWHR_RANK ) which is computed every year and takes values from 0 to 1. The other independent variables include fund characteristics such as management fee (MGTFEE ), 
performance fee (PERFFEE ), high water mark indicator (HWM ), lock-up period in years (LOCKUP ), leverage indicator (LEVERAGE ), fund age in years (AGE ), redemption 
period in months (REDEMPTION ), and log of fund size (log(FUNDSIZE )) as well as dummy variables for year and fund investment strategy. The t -statistics are in parentheses.
For the RETURN  and ALPHA  regressions, they are derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by fund and month. For the SHARPE  and INFORMATION  regressions, 
they are derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by fund. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2015. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant
at the 1% level.
Dependent variable
TURNOVER LOTTERY DISPOSITION NONSPRATIO ACTIVESHARE
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FWHR 0.748 0.061** 0.236* 0.134** 0.059**
(1.76) (3.73) (2.10) (3.99) (2.80)
MGTFEE 0.081 0.004 -0.033 -0.013 0.004
(1.59) (0.92) (-1.04) (-1.54) (0.63)
PERFFEE -0.017 0.001* 0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(-1.17) (2.34) (0.29) (-0.10) (-1.44)
HWM 0.197 -0.000 0.022 -0.015 0.013
(1.63) (-0.05) (0.55) (-1.17) (1.53)
LOCKUP -0.144** 0.006 -0.057* 0.010 -0.015*
(-3.48) (1.05) (-2.03) (1.07) (-2.00)
LEVERAGE -0.064 0.007 0.006 0.013 0.001
(-0.78) (1.41) (0.18) (1.38) (0.16)
AGE -0.021* 0.000 0.004 -0.001 -0.006*
(-1.96) (0.09) (0.37) (-0.20) (-2.13)
REDEMPTION 0.018 0.003* 0.005 0.000 -0.003*
(1.80) (2.45) (0.86) (0.30) (-1.98)
log(FUNDSIZE ) 0.021 0.002 -0.002 0.005* -0.000
(1.12) (1.56) (-0.28) (2.34) (-0.05)
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.035 0.082 0.080 0.050 0.054
N 1613 1521 513 1586 1640
Dependent variable
Table 4
Multivariate regressions on hedge fund trading behavior measures
This table reports results from multivariate regressions on hedge fund trading behavior measures. The dependent
variables include TURNOVER , LOTTERY , DISPOSITION , NONSPRATIO , and ACTIVESHARE . TURNOVER is the
annualized turnover of a hedge fund manager's long-only stock portfolio. LOTTERY is the maximum daily stock return
over the past one month averaged across stocks held by the fund as in Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011). DISPOSITION 
is percentage of gains realized (PGR) minus percentage of losses realized (PLR) as in Odean (1998). NONSPRATIO is the
ratio of the number of non-S&P 500 index stocks bought in a quarter to the total number of new positions in the quarter.
ACTIVESHARE is the Active Share (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009) relative to the S&P 500. The independent variable of
interest is the average facial width-to-height ratio of the fund managers in the fund (FWHR ). Only male managers are
included in the sample. The other independent variables include fund characteristics such as management fee (MGTFEE ), 
performance fee (PERFFEE ), high water mark indicator (HWM ), lock-up period in years (LOCKUP ), leverage indicator
(LEVERAGE ), fund age in years (AGE ), redemption period in months (REDEMPTION ), and log of fund size
(log(FUNDSIZE )) as well as dummy variables for year and fund investment strategy. The t -statistics in parentheses are
derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by fund. The sample period is from January 1994 to December
2015. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
VIOLATION OMEGA
Logit Cox Logit OLS
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
FWHR 0.587** 1.915** 1.612** 0.173*




MGTFEE -0.013 0.985 0.114 -0.008
(-0.26) (-0.33) (0.88) (-0.26)
PERFFEE 0.005 1.005 -0.020 -0.095**
(1.03) (1.07) (-1.57) (-22.29)
HWM -0.123 0.882 0.220 -0.199**
(-1.66) (-1.77) (1.11) (-5.50)
LOCKUP -0.040 0.963 -0.102 -1.572*
(-0.76) (-0.76) (-0.71) (-2.01)
LEVERAGE 0.122* 1.136* -0.049 -0.108**
(2.34) (2.49) (-0.35) (-3.49)
AGE 0.026** 1.005 -0.052 -0.119**
(5.26) (0.25) (-0.68) (-26.50)
REDEMPTION 0.020 1.018 -0.009 -0.000
(1.77) (1.68) (-0.36) (-0.09)
log(FUNDSIZE ) -0.195** 0.818** 0.078* 0.003
(-13.08) (-12.13) (2.18) (0.53)
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.096 0.073 0.020 0.756




Multivariate regressions on hedge fund operational risk metrics
This table reports results from multivariate regressions on hedge fund operational risk metrics. The
dependent variables include fund termination indicator (TERMINATION ), Form ADV violation indicator
(VIOLATION ), and ω-Score (OMEGA ). TERMINATION takes a value of one after a hedge fund stops
reporting and states that it has liquidated, and takes a value of zero otherwise. VIOLATION takes a value of
one when the hedge fund manager reports on his Form ADV that he has been associated with a regulatory,
civil, or criminal violation, and takes a value of zero otherwise. OMEGA or fund ω-Score is an operational
risk instrument derived from fund performance, volatility, age, size, fee structure, and other fund
characteristics as per Brown et al. (2009). OMEGA is estimated over each non-overlapping 24-month
period after fund inception. The primary independent variable of interest is the average facial width-to-
height ratio of the fund managers in the fund (FWHR ). Only male managers are included in the sample.
The other independent variables include fund characteristics such as fund return averaged over the last 24
months (RETURN ), management fee (MGTFEE ), performance fee (PERFFEE ), high water mark indicator
(HWM ), lock-up period in years (LOCKUP ), leverage indicator (LEVERAGE ), fund age in years (AGE ), 
redemption period in months (REDEMPTION ), and log of fund size (log(FUNDSIZE )) as well as dummy
variables for year and fund investment strategy. The t -statistics in parentheses are derived from robust
standard errors that are clustered by fund. The marginal effects are in brackets. The sample period is from








t -statistic of 
alpha
SNPMRF SCMLC BD10RET BAAMTSY PTFSBD PTFSFX PTFSCOM Adj. R 2
Fund of hedge funds portfolio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Portfolio 1 (high fWHR) 0.49 0.27 -1.07 -0.66 0.17** 0.05 -1.24* -2.34** -0.02* 0.02* 0.01 0.19
Portfolio 2 2.63* 2.25 1.24 1.47 0.17** 0.07** -1.03** -2.76** -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.49
Portfolio 3 2.41* 2.00 0.98 1.01 0.14** 0.13** -0.88* -1.76** -0.02** 0.01 0.00 0.37
Portfolio 4 4.15** 3.29 2.77** 2.84 0.18** 0.08** -0.46 -2.22** -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.42
Portfolio 5 3.50** 2.81 1.97** 2.28 0.20** 0.16** -0.11 -1.41** -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.53
Portfolio 6 5.33** 2.94 4.03* 2.32 0.13** 0.12** -0.84 -1.41 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.11
Portfolio 7 3.11** 2.42 1.54 1.51 0.16** 0.10** -0.85* -2.03** -0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.39
Portfolio 8 2.79* 2.36 1.57 1.6 0.12** 0.12** -0.93* -2.16** -0.02** 0.01* 0.01 0.33
Portfolio 9 3.66** 2.92 2.30* 2.24 0.16** 0.04 -1.48** -2.48** -0.01* 0.02** 0.01 0.35
Portfolio 10 (low fWHR) 4.87** 3.58 3.46** 2.97 0.17** 0.10** -0.72 -1.65** -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.28
Spread (1-10) -4.39* -1.97 -4.53* -2.27 0.00 -0.05 -0.52 -0.69 -0.01 0.02** 0.00 -0.10
Table 6
Portfolio sorts on fund of hedge funds (FoF) manager fWHR
Funds of hedge funds (FoFs) are sorted into ten portfolios based on the average facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) of the managers managing the FoFs. Only male managers are included in the sample.
FoF portfolio performance is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. The Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors are S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF ), Russell 2000 return minus
S&P 500 return (SCMLC ), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for the duration (BD10RET ), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond
over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY ), bond PTFS (PTFSBD ), currency PTFS (PTFSFX ), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM ). The t -statistics derived from
White (1980) standard errors are in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2015. * Significant at the 5% level ** Significant at the 1% level.
High-fWHR portfolio (HT) Medium-fWHR portfolio (MT) Low-fWHR portfolio (LT) Spread 1 (HT-LT) Spread 2 (HT-MT) Spread 3 (LT-MT)
Hedge fund portfolio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High-fWHR portfolio (HT) 0.904** -0.067 -0.951 1.855** 0.972* -0.884
(4.55) (-0.12) (-1.44) (2.82) (2.01) (-1.10)
Medium-fWHR portfolio (MT) 0.463* 0.471 1.623* -1.160 -0.008 1.152
(2.13) (0.85) (2.27) (-1.75) (-0.02) (1.26)
Low-fWHR portfolio (LT) 0.103 0.030 2.183** -2.081** 0.073 2.153**
(0.46) (0.11) (3.15) (-3.19) (0.20) (2.66)
R2 0.838 0.090 0.595 0.298 0.329 0.447
N 264 264 264 264 264 264
High-fWHR portfolio (HT) 1.037** 0.102 -1.985** 3.022** 0.935 -2.087*
(4.99) (0.18) (-2.78) (4.23) (1.94) (-2.31)
Medium-fWHR portfolio (MT) 0.677** 0.224 1.139 -0.462 0.453 0.915
(3.17) (0.49) (1.49) (-0.66) (0.98) (0.97)
Low-fWHR portfolio (LT) 0.041 -0.004 2.666** -2.625** 0.045 2.670**
(0.19) (-0.02) (3.68) (-3.85) (0.13) (3.25)
R2 0.856 0.140 0.627 0.381 0.375 0.483
N 264 264 264 264 264 264
Panel B: Controlling for co-variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors
Table 7
Time series regressions on fund of hedge funds (FoF) portfolio excess returns
This table reports time-series regressions on fund of hedge funds (FoF) portfolio excess returns with hedge fund portfolio excess returns as independent variables. The high-fWHR FoF portfolio is the average
excess return of all FoFs with fWHR in the top 30th percentile. The low-fWHR FoF portfolio is the average excess return of all FoFs with fWHR in the bottom 30th percentile. The medium-fWHR FoF portfolio
is the average excess return of all other FoFs. Excess return is fund return in excess of the risk-free rate. The variable fWHR is facial width-to-height ratio. The high-, medium-, and low-fWHR hedge fund
portfolios are defined analogously. Time-series regressions are estimated on the three FoF portfolios with the three hedge fund portfolios as independent variables. Time-series regressions are also estimated on
the spreads between pairs of FoF portfolios with the same set of regressors. Spread 1 is the difference between the high- and low-fWHR FoF portfolios. Spread 2 is the difference between the high- and medium-
fWHR FoF portfolios. Spread 3 is the difference between the low- and medium-fWHR FoF portfolios. The t -statistics derived from White (1980) standard errors are in parentheses. The sample period is from
January 1994 to December 2015. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level. 
Fund of hedge funds (FoF) portfolio








t -statistic of 
alpha
SNPMRF SCMLC BD10RET BAAMTSY PTFSBD PTFSFX PTFSCOM Adj. R 2
Hedge fund portfolio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Portfolio 1 (high flow) 7.25** 3.44 3.17** 5.28 0.28** 0.18** -1.02** -2.71** -0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.624
Portfolio 2 3.86* 1.98 1.31 1.80 0.30** 0.25** -0.98 -1.56 0.00 0.02* 0.01 0.426
Portfolio 3 3.06 1.58 3.19** 3.60 0.28** 0.19** -2.12** -3.45** 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.516
Portfolio 4 5.39** 2.91 2.96** 3.96 0.30** 0.21** -1.78** -2.82** -0.02* 0.02** 0.01 0.569
Portfolio 5 3.67* 1.97 1.26 1.56 0.33** 0.15** 0.67 -0.34 0.01 0.02* -0.02 0.523
Portfolio 6 1.83 1.00 0.12 0.12 0.36** 0.19** 0.05 0.04 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.592
Portfolio 7 1.08 0.67 -0.84 -0.84 0.31** 0.22** -0.37 -1.50* 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.565
Portfolio 8 4.22* 2.08 1.28 1.56 0.27** 0.18** -0.89* -2.25** -0.01 0.01* -0.00 0.630
Portfolio 9 5.07** 3.19 0.36 0.48 0.34** 0.21** -1.72** -3.40** -0.02* 0.03** -0.01 0.668
Portfolio 10 (low flow) 1.10 0.43 -1.04 -1.92 0.26** 0.13** -1.45** -2.56** 0.01 0.02** -0.01 0.538
Spread (1-10) 6.15 1.85 4.21** 5.21 0.02 0.05 0.43 -0.15 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.086
Portfolio 1 (high flow) 7.42** 4.20 5.28** 4.02 0.28** 0.18** -1.02** -2.71** -0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.624
Portfolio 2 6.06** 3.42 3.84** 3.1 0.23** 0.24** -1.06* -1.50* -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.479
Portfolio 3 3.70** 1.54 0.72 0.39 0.28** 0.23** -0.71 -0.82 -0.01 0.01* -0.00 0.538
Portfolio 4 6.02** 2.48 3.36* 2.02 0.31** 0.24** -0.86 -2.58** -0.04** 0.01 -0.01 0.495
Portfolio 5 8.20** 3.89 6.24** 3.85 0.40** 0.24** -1.99** -3.31** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.576
Portfolio 6 5.08** 2.6 3.00* 2.18 0.29** 0.19** -0.27 -1.84* -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.457
Portfolio 7 5.77** 3.13 5.02** 2.88 0.34** 0.18** -0.30 -1.31 -0.01 0.02* -0.00 0.551
Portfolio 8 4.96* 2.35 2.88 1.8 0.32** 0.21** -0.30 -0.80 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.568
Portfolio 9 4.34 1.78 2.04 1.26 0.31** 0.15** -1.02 -2.66** -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.486
Portfolio 10 (low flow) 5.90** 2.94 4.20** 2.58 0.44** 0.22** -0.12 -1.90* 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.610
Spread (1-10) 1.52 0.57 1.08 0.52 -0.16 -0.04 -0.90* -0.81 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.014
Panel A: High-fWHR funds
Panel B: Low-fWHR funds
Table 8
Portfolio sorts on hedge fund flow
Hedge funds are sorted into ten portfolios every month based on fund flow last month. Hedge fund portfolio performance is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. The Fung and
Hsieh (2004) factors are S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF ), Russell 2000 return minus S&P 500 return (SCMLC ), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury
bond appropriately adjusted for the duration (BD10RET ), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY ), bond PTFS
(PTFSBD ), currency PTFS (PTFSFX ), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM ). The t -statistics derived from White (1980) standard errors are in parentheses. High-fWHR and low-fWHR funds are
those in the top and bottom 30th percentiles based on fund fWHR, respectively. Facial width-to-height ratio or fWHR is computed for male managers only. Fund fWHR is the average fWHR of the
managers managing a hedge fund. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2015. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FWHR -0.382 -0.345 -0.894** -0.673* -0.321* -0.504* -0.458
(-0.95) (-1.02) (-2.62) (-2.45) (-2.02) (-2.41) (-1.44)
MGTFEE 0.404** 0.222** 0.144 0.137 -0.074 -0.099 0.126
(3.55) (2.93) (1.43) (1.55) (-0.79) (-0.83) (1.03)
PERFFEE -0.001 0.017 -0.007 0.021** -0.011 0.007 0.014
(-0.05) (1.96) (-0.74) (2.89) (-0.69) (0.48) (1.37)
HWM -0.156 -0.124 -0.162 -0.110 0.350** 0.154 0.184*
(-1.02) (-1.14) (-1.59) (-1.39) (2.81) (1.40) (2.18)
LOCKUP 0.005 0.085 0.162 0.013 2.519 3.849 -0.077
(0.04) (1.02) (1.67) (0.23) (0.89) (1.82) (-0.09)
LEVERAGE 0.141* 0.023 0.015 0.008 0.022 -0.071 0.015
(2.37) (0.37) (0.17) (0.09) (0.17) (-0.59) (0.20)
AGE -0.022* -0.007 -0.012 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.010
(-2.45) (-0.71) (-1.60) (0.16) (-0.30) (-0.46) (-1.04)
REDEMPTION 0.006 0.006 0.022 -0.006 0.036 0.021 0.050*
(0.28) (0.42) (1.49) (-0.67) (1.70) (0.91) (2.26)
log(FUNDSIZE ) 0.034 -0.014 0.062** 0.041* -0.086* -0.028 -0.026
(0.93) (-0.32) (2.81) (2.08) (-2.09) (-0.92) (-0.62)
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.054 0.018 0.035 0.016 0.026 0.020 0.024
N 36510 36510 42684 42684 13623 10008 20844
Table 9
Multivariate regressions on hedge fund performance, subsample analysis
This table reports results from multivariate regressions on hedge fund performance. The dependent variables include hedge fund return (RETURN ) and alpha (ALPHA ). RETURN is the monthly hedge fund net-of-fee
return. ALPHA is the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor monthly alpha where factor loadings are estimated over the last 24 months. The primary independent variable of interest is the average facial width-to-height ratio
of the fund managers in the fund (FWHR ). Only male managers are included in the sample. The other independent variables include fund characteristics such as management fee (MGTFEE ), performance fee (PERFFEE ), 
high water mark indicator (HWM ), lock-up period in years (LOCKUP ), leverage indicator (LEVERAGE ), fund age in years (AGE ), redemption period in months (REDEMPTION ), and log of fund size (log(FUNDSIZE )) as 
well as dummy variables for year and fund investment strategy. The t -statistics derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by fund and month are in parentheses. Manager total delta is as per defined in Appendix
A of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009). Each year funds are sorted based on manager total deltas at the end of the previous year. Funds with high manager total deltas have manager total deltas in the top 30th percentile.
Funds with low manager total deltas have manager total deltas in the bottom 30th percentile. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2015. * Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level.
Funds with high manager total deltas Funds with low manager total deltas Funds with personal capital Funds with no personal capital
Selection
RETURN ALPHA equation RETURN ALPHA
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FWHR -0.529** -0.375** -0.555** -0.395*
(-2.93) (-3.35) [-2.66] [-2.54]
MGTFEE 0.064 0.045 0.130** 0.135*
(1.52) (1.27) [2.79] [2.46]
PERFFEE -0.004 0.006 -0.004 0.002
(-0.87) (1.52) [-0.73] [0.22]
HWM 0.110* 0.115* 0.043 0.125*
(2.21) (2.31) [0.72] [2.06]
LOCKUP 0.079 0.03 0.061 0.024
(1.94) (0.83) [1.42] [0.44]
LEVERAGE 0.027 0.021 0.018 -0.019
(0.90) (0.59) [0.44] [-0.36]
AGE -0.011** -0.011** 0.063 0.114
(-2.87) (-3.51) [1.09] [1.50]
REDEMPTION 0.015** 0.004 0.009 -0.010
(3.07) (0.66) [1.50] [-1.76]
log(FUNDSIZE ) -0.052** -0.001 -0.011 -0.036*
(-3.58) (-0.06) [-0.93] [-2.31]
log(INCEPTION_FIRMSTRATFLOW ) 0.033**
[3.54]
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.027 0.015 0.018 0.002 0.005
N 150306 111893 12597 111547 79508
OLS regression Regression equation
Table 10
Explaining hedge fund performance, controlling for selection bias
The Heckman (1979) selection model is used to control for selection bias in regressions on the cross-section of hedge fund
performance. Two sets of regressions are estimated: one with monthly return (RETURN ) as the dependent variable and another
with monthly alpha (ALPHA ) as the dependent variable. RETURN is the monthly hedge fund net-of-fee return. ALPHA is the
Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor monthly alpha where factor loadings are estimated over the last 24 months. The primary
independent variable of interest is the average facial width-to-height ratio of the fund managers in the fund (FWHR ). Only
male managers are included in the sample. The other independent variables include fund characteristics such as management fee 
(MGTFEE ), performance fee (PERFFEE ), high water mark indicator (HWM ), lock-up period in years (LOCKUP ), leverage
indicator (LEVERAGE ), fund age in years (AGE ), redemption period in months (REDEMPTION ), and log of fund size
(log(FUNDSIZE )) as well as dummy variables for year and fund investment strategy. Columns 1 and 2 report the regression
results before correcting for selection bias. Column 3 reports the results from a probit selection equation, estimated using
maximum likelihood, for the probability of a hedge fund being managed by a manager whose facial image is available on the
internet. The exclusion restriction we use in the selection equation is the firm strategy flow during the firm inception year
(INCEPTION_FIRMSTRATFLOW ). Columns 4 and 5 report the regression results after correcting for selection bias. The t -
statistics in parentheses are derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by fund and month. The z -statistics are in
brackets. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2015. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1%
level.
Heckman model
RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA
Independent variable (1) (2) Independent variable (3) (4)
FWHR -0.531** -0.516** FWHR -0.529** -0.341*
(-2.96) (-3.65) (-2.97) (-2.31)
FWHR -0.438* -0.408** FWHR -0.508** -0.503**
(-2.48) (-2.74) (-2.85) (-3.42)
FWHR -0.530** -0.512** FWHR -0.210** -0.566**
(-3.02) (-3.64) (-7.36) (-5.03)
FWHR -0.774** -0.847* FWHR -0.366* -0.356*
(-3.51) (-2.15) (-2.01) (-2.30)
FWHR -0.549** -0.451* FWHR -0.783** -0.427**
(-2.84) (-2.39) (-4.78) (-3.52)
FWHR -0.286* -0.322** FWHR -0.505** -0.365**
(-2.08) (-2.68) (-2.78) (-3.22)
FWHR -0.590** -0.393** FWLHR -0.283** -0.267**
(-2.63) (-2.98) (-3.29) (-3.97)
FWHR -0.529** -0.461** LHWH 1.836** 1.831*
(-2.97) (-2.73) (2.59) (2.12)
FWHR -0.529** -0.593** FWHR -0.502** -0.361**
(-2.97) (-3.14) (-2.92) (-3.39)
Panel A: Controlling for marital status
Panel B: Controlling for firm fixed effects
Panel C: Controlling for manager age
Panel D: Controlling for sensation seeking
Table 11
Alternative explanations and robustness tests
This table reports robustness tests on the baseline multivariate regressions on hedge fund performance. The dependent variables include hedge fund return
(RETURN ) and alpha (ALPHA ). RETURN is the monthly hedge fund net-of-fee return. ALPHA is the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor monthly alpha
where factor loadings are estimated over the last 24 months. The primary independent variable of interest is the average facial width-to-height ratio of the
fund managers in the fund (FWHR ). Unless otherwise noted, only male managers are included in the sample. The other independent variables include fund
characteristics such as management fee (MGTFEE ), performance fee (PERFFEE ), high water mark indicator (HWM ), lock-up period in years (LOCKUP ), 
leverage indicator (LEVERAGE ), fund age in years (AGE ), redemption period in months (REDEMPTION ), and log of fund size (log(FUNDSIZE )) as well
as dummy variables for year and fund investment strategy. The coefficient estimates on these control variables are omitted for brevity. Panel A reports
results after controlling for marital status via a marriage dummy. Panel B reports results after controlling for firm fixed effects. Panel C reports results after
controlling for manager age. Panel D reports results after controlling for sensation seeking via manager sports car ownership. Panel E reports results adjusted 
for backfill bias by removing return observations before fund database listing date. Panel F reports results after unsmoothing returns using the Getmansky,
Lo, and Makarov (2004) algorithm. Panel G reports results after adding back fees to form pre-fee returns. Panel H reports results after augmenting the Fung
and Hsieh (2004) model with the MSCI Emerging Market Index excess return. Panel I reports results after augmenting the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model
with the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. Panel J reports results after augmenting the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with the Agarwal and Naik 
(2004) out-of-the-money call and put option factors. Panel K adjusts for fund termination by assuming that a fund delivers a -10% return for the month
after it stops reporting. Panel L reports results for style-adjusted performance. Panel M reports results after excluding the top 10 percent of funds based on
fWHR each January 1st. Panel N reports results from firm returns computed from Thomson Financial 13F stock holdings. Panel O reports results after
limiting the sample to Caucasian managers. Panel P reports results with FWLHR in place of FWHR . FWLHR is face width-to-lower height ratio and is
positively related to testosterone (Lefevre et al., 2013). Panel Q reports results with LHWH in place of FWHR . LHWH is face lower height-to-whole face
height ratio and is negatively related to testosterone (Lefevre et al., 2013). Panel R reports results after including female managers in the sample. The t -
statistics in parentheses are derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by fund and month. The sample period is from January 1994 to December
2015. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variable Dependent variable
Panel M: Exclude funds in the top ten percentile based on fWHR
Panel L: Style-adjusted return and alpha
Panel K: Adjusted for termination returns
Panel J: FH (2004) model augmented with Agarwal and Naik (2004) 
OTM call and put option factors
Panel I: FH (2004) model augmented with Pástor and Stambaugh 
(2003) liquidity factor
Panel R: Including female fund managers
Panel Q: Face lower height-to-whole face height ratio (LHWH)
Panel E: Adjusted for backfill bias
Panel F: Adjusted for serial correlation
Panel G: Pre-fee returns
Panel H: FH (2004) model augmented with emerging markets factor
Panel P: Face width-to-lower height ratio (FWLHR)
Panel O: Caucasian only sample
Panel N: Returns computed from 13-F long-only holdings
Internet Appendix: Do Alpha Males Deliver
Alpha? Facial Structure and Hedge Funds
In the Internet Appendix, we provide a medley of additional robustness tests to verify
the strength of our empirical results.
1. Additional robustness tests
1.1. Managers who smile in their photos
One concern is that fWHR may be inflated for managers who smile broadly in their photos.
Note that we define a broad smile as that which would a↵ect the fWHR calculation by
impacting the measurement of face height. For this to systematically a↵ect our results, it
must be that managers who underperform are also more likely to smile broadly when having
their photos taken, which seems counterintuitive. Nonetheless, to adjust for this, we redo the
baseline regressions after removing managers with such photos. There are 344 such managers
in the sample. The results reported in Panel A of Table A1 indicate that our findings are
robust to this potential source of measurement error.
1.2. Managers without forward-facing photos
Another concern is that we may underestimate fWHR for photos in which the manager is
not fully forward facing. To adjust for this, we redo the baseline regressions after removing
managers without fully forward-facing photos. There are 308 such managers in the sample.
The results reported in Panel B of Table A1 indicate that our findings are robust to this
potential source of measurement error.
1.3. Managers with significant facial adiposity
Extreme facial adiposity or fat may inflate our measurement of fWHR. To adjust for this, we
first make a subjective assessment of each manager’s facial adiposity based on the manager’s
photo. Next, we exclude the top 10% of photos, i.e., 274 managers, ranked by facial adiposity
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and redo the baseline regressions. The results reported in Panel C of Table A1 indicate that
our findings are robust to adjusting for facial adiposity.
1.4. Subsample analysis
To test whether the results are robust across subsamples, we split the sample period into two
subperiods, i.e., January 1994 to December 2005 and January 2006 to December 2015, and
redo the baseline regressions. The results reported in Panels D and E of Table A1 indicate
that while the relation between fWHR and performance is weaker in the later subperiod, it
is still economically relevant and statistically significant at the 5% level.
1.5. Alternative exclusion restrictions
We consider two alternative exclusion restrictions for the Heckman (1979) sample selection
adjustment: firm strategy flow in the 24-month period prior to firm inception and firm
inception AUM. As per the baseline sample selection correction, we exclude fund returns
reported within one year of firm inception. The second stage results reported in Panels F
and G of Table A1 indicate that our results are robust to alternative specifications.
1.6. Speeding tickets
Another way to account for sensation seeking is to control for the number of speeding tickets
as in Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009). In that e↵ort, we obtain speeding ticket information
by searching for court records on the PeopleFinders dataset using manager name, city, and
state. We are able to obtain speeding ticket information, including null records, for 1,262
managers. The results reported in Panel H of Table A1 indicate that sensation seeking, at
least based on speeding tickets, cannot explain our findings.
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1.7. Overconfidence
Insofar as high-fWHR managers are more overconfident than low-fWHR managers, overcon-
fidence (Barber and Odean, 2000; 2001) may explain our findings. Barber and Odean (2000;
2001) argue that overconfident individuals tend to trade excessively, i.e., trading hurts their
performance more. Therefore, to control for overconfidence, we first define EXCESSIVE-
TRADING as the di↵erence between the quarterly performance of a hedge fund firm had
the firm not traded since the start of the year and the firm’s actual quarterly performance
based on 13F long-only holdings . Next, we redo our baseline regressions after controlling for
EXCESSIVETRADING last quarter. The results reported in Panel I of Table A1 suggest
that overconfidence does not explain our findings.
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RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA
Independent variable (1) (2) Independent variable (3) (4)
FWHR -0.532** -0.408** FWHR -0.649** -0.543**
(-2.88) (-3.70) [-3.92] [-3.63]
FWHR -0.502** -0.359** FWHR -0.631** -0.531**
(-2.92) (-3.40) [-3.32] [-4.20]
FWHR -0.502** -0.370** FWHR -0.505** -0.359**
(-2.78) (-3.25) (-2.94) (-3.37)
Panel I: Controlling for excessive trading
FWHR -0.703** -0.724** FWHR -0.721** -0.523**
(-3.47) (-3.37) (-4.98) (-4.57)
FWHR -0.375* -0.318*
(-2.06) (-2.15)
Panel E: Subsample analysis - Jan 2006 to Dec 2015
Panel B: Excluding managers whose photos are not  fully forward-
facing
Panel G: Firm inception AUM as exclusion restriction
Panel C: Excluding top 10% of managers based on facial adiposity
Panel D: Subsample analysis - Jan 1994 to Dec 2005
Panel H: Controlling for number of speeding tickets




This table reports additional robustness tests on the baseline multivariate regressions on hedge fund performance. The dependent variables include hedge
fund return (RETURN ) and alpha (ALPHA ). RETURN is the monthly hedge fund net-of-fee return. ALPHA is the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor
monthly alpha where factor loadings are estimated over the last 24 months. The primary independent variable of interest is the average facial width-to-
height ratio of the fund managers in the fund (FWHR ). Unless otherwise noted, only male managers are included in the sample. The other independent
variables include fund characteristics such as management fee (MGTFEE ), performance fee (PERFFEE ), high water mark indicator (HWM ), lock-up
period in years (LOCKUP ), leverage indicator (LEVERAGE ), fund age in years (AGE ), redemption period in months (REDEMPTION ), and log of fund
size (log(FUNDSIZE )) as well as dummy variables for year and fund investment strategy. The coefficient estimates on these control variables are omitted
for brevity. Panel A reports results after removing observations computed from photos where the hedge fund manager is smiling broadly. Panel B reports
results after removing observations from photos where the hedge fund manager is not fully front facing, i.e., tilted to the left or the right. Panels C and D
report results for two subsample periods, namely, January 1994 to December 2005 and January 2006 to December 2015, respectively. Panels E and F report 
Heckman second stage results with two alternative exclusion restrictions, namely, firm strategy flow in the 24-month period prior to firm inception and firm
inception AUM, respectively. Panel G reports results after controlling for manager excessive trading as per Barber and Odean (2000, 2001). The t -statistics 
in parentheses are derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by fund and month. The z-statistics are in brackets. The sample period is from
January 1994 to December 2015. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variable Dependent variable
RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA











MGTFEE 0.077 0.046 0.079* 0.047 0.079* 0.047 0.077 0.046 0.077 0.046
(1.94) (1.20) (1.98) (1.23) (1.98) (1.23) (1.92) (1.20) (1.91) (1.20)
PERFFEE -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.003
(-0.55) (0.47) (-0.60) (0.43) (-0.60) (0.42) (-0.56) (0.46) (-0.58) (0.43)
HWM 0.052 0.067 0.053 0.068 0.053 0.068 0.054 0.067 0.056 0.070
(0.94) (1.09) (0.95) (1.11) (0.96) (1.11) (0.97) (1.09) (1.01) (1.13)
LOCKUP 0.103* 0.119 0.113* 0.128 0.112* 0.127 0.099* 0.119 0.103* 0.124
(2.14) (1.64) (2.41) (1.79) (2.40) (1.79) (2.06) (1.64) (2.14) (1.69)
LEVERAGE 0.032 0.050 0.034 0.052 0.034 0.052 0.030 0.051 0.032 0.052
(1.11) (0.92) (1.17) (0.95) (1.18) (0.96) (1.05) (0.93) (1.09) (0.95)
AGE -0.021** -0.010 -0.021** -0.010 -0.021** -0.010 -0.022** -0.010 -0.021** -0.009
(-4.13) (-1.62) (-4.17) (-1.63) (-4.17) (-1.63) (-4.30) (-1.63) (-4.24) (-1.58)
REDEMPTION 0.015* 0.007 0.016* 0.007 0.016* 0.007 0.015* 0.007 0.015* 0.006
(2.38) (0.99) (2.45) (1.08) (2.46) (1.08) (2.38) (0.99) (2.33) (0.95)
log(FUNDSIZE ) 0.021 0.000 0.018 -0.002 0.018 -0.002 0.020 0.000 0.020 0.000
(1.46) (0.01) (1.22) (-0.15) (1.22) (-0.15) (1.39) (0.02) (1.38) (0.02)
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.026 0.006 0.025 0.006 0.025 0.006 0.026 0.006 0.026 0.006
N 166164 122392 166164 122392 166164 122392 166164 122392 166164 122392
Table A2
Multivariate regressions on hedge fund performance with trading behavior measures as independent variables
This table reports results from multivariate regressions on hedge fund performance. The dependent variables include hedge fund return (RETURN ) and alpha (ALPHA ). RETURN is the monthly hedge fund net-of-
fee return. ALPHA is the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor monthly alpha where factor loadings are estimated over the last 24 months. The independent variables of interest include TURNOVER , LOTTERY , 
DISPOSITION , NONSPRATIO , and ACTIVESHARE . TURNOVER is the annualized turnover of a hedge fund manager's long-only stock portfolio. LOTTERY is the maximum daily stock return over the past one
month averaged across stocks held by the fund as in Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011). DISPOSITION is percentage of gains realized (PGR) minus percentage of losses realized (PLR) as in Odean (1998).
NONSPRATIO is the ratio of the number of non-S&P 500 index stocks bought in a quarter to the total number of new positions in the quarter. ACTIVESHARE is Active Share (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009) relative
to the S&P 500. These trading behavior measures are computed in the prior quarter. The other independent variables include fund characteristics such as management fee (MGTFEE ), performance fee (PERFFEE ), 
high water mark indicator (HWM ), lock-up period in years (LOCKUP ), leverage indicator (LEVERAGE ), fund age in years (AGE ), redemption period in months (REDEMPTION ), and log of fund size
(log(FUNDSIZE )) as well as dummy variables for year and fund investment strategy. The t -statistics in parentheses are derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by fund and month. The sample period is
from January 1994 to December 2015. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variable
RISK IDIORISK SYSTEMRISK TAILRISK
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
FWHR -0.611 -0.739 0.128 -0.057
(-1.61) (-1.61) (0.35) (-0.36)
MGTFEE 0.348 0.363* -0.015 0.054
(1.79) (2.06) (-0.18) (0.88)
PERFFEE -0.023* -0.005 -0.018* -0.001
(-2.16) (-0.47) (-2.27) (-0.12)
HWM 0.080 -0.135 0.215 -0.307
(0.49) (-0.61) (1.33) (-1.09)
LOCKUP 0.233** 0.221** 0.012 0.431
(2.66) (2.68) (0.14) (1.00)
LEVERAGE 0.149 0.307* -0.158 -0.001
(0.89) (2.31) (-0.96) (-0.01)
AGE 0.023* 0.014 0.009 -0.015
(2.51) (0.62) (0.51) (-1.33)
REDEMPTION 0.046* 0.034 0.012 0.000
(2.30) (1.34) (0.47) (0.01)
log(FUNDSIZE ) -0.288** -0.224** -0.064* -0.057*
(-6.87) (-6.27) (-2.32) (-2.09)
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.165 0.233 0.219 0.009
N 5814 5814 5814 5814
Table A3
Multivariate regressions on hedge fund risk
This table reports results from multivariate regressions on hedge fund risk. The dependent variables
include hedge fund risk (RISK ), idiosyncratic risk (IDIORISK ), systematic risk (SYSTEMRISK ), and 
tail risk (RISK ). RISK is the standard deviation of monthly hedge fund returns. IDIORISK is the
standard deviation of monthly hedge fund residuals from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor
model. SYSTEMRISK is the square root of the difference between the variance of monthly hedge
fund returns and that of monthly hedge fund residuals. TAILRISK is tail risk as defined in Agarwal,
Ruenzi, and Weigert (2018). The risk measures are estimated over each nonoverlapping 24-month
period after fund inception. The independent variable of interest is the average facial width-to-height
ratio of the fund managers in the fund (FWHR ). Only male managers are included in the sample.
The other independent variables include fund characteristics such as management fee (MGTFEE ), 
performance fee (PERFFEE ), high water mark indicator (HWM ), lock-up period in years
(LOCKUP ), leverage indicator (LEVERAGE ), fund age in years (AGE ), redemption period in
months (REDEMPTION ), and log of fund size (log(FUNDSIZE )) as well as dummy variables for
year and fund investment strategy. The t -statistics in parentheses are derived from robust standard
errors that are clustered by fund. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2015. *
Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variable
RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FWHR -0.747** -0.702** -0.068 0.324 -0.386 -0.380** -0.473** -0.419**
(-3.51) (-4.06) (-0.22) (1.07) (-1.82) (-2.77) (-2.68) (-2.88)
MGTFEE 0.139 0.060 -0.158* -0.172 0.042 0.051 0.056 0.015
(1.59) (0.84) (-1.98) (-1.82) (0.87) (1.12) (1.24) (0.32)
PERFFEE -0.022* -0.006 0.002 0.010 0.008 0.018** -0.000 0.006
(-2.43) (-0.83) (0.36) (1.40) (1.85) (3.69) (-0.03) (1.09)
HWM 0.219* 0.186 0.029 0.192* 0.076 0.072 0.036 0.030
(2.02) (1.84) (0.29) (1.97) (1.44) (1.30) (0.67) (0.45)
LOCKUP 0.009 -0.070 0.210** 0.129* 0.113* 0.032 0.114* 0.073
(0.12) (-1.46) (4.42) (2.01) (2.39) (0.68) (2.57) (1.12)
LEVERAGE 0.061 0.040 0.057 0.019 0.009 0.018 0.034 0.034
(1.17) (0.69) (0.91) (0.23) (0.30) (0.40) (1.33) (0.61)
AGE -0.011* -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 -0.012** -0.013** -0.021** -0.010
(-2.20) (-1.69) (-0.65) (-0.91) (-3.33) (-3.12) (-4.14) (-1.52)
REDEMPTION 0.022 -0.012 0.015 -0.016 0.006 0.003 0.011 0.002
(1.77) (-0.80) (0.59) (-0.69) (0.96) (0.49) (1.35) (0.33)
log(FUNDSIZE ) -0.033 0.020 -0.062* 0.056 -0.051** -0.007 0.016 0.013
(-1.01) (1.53) (-2.52) (1.75) (-3.82) (-0.54) (1.15) (0.88)
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.027 0.017 0.037 0.028 0.027 0.017 0.026 0.007
N 40487 30215 16677 12747 76882 56777 134046 99737
Table A4
Multivariate regressions on hedge fund performance for managers sorted by role within fund
This table reports results from multivariate regressions on hedge fund performance. The dependent variables include hedge fund return (RETURN ) and alpha (ALPHA ). 
RETURN is the monthly hedge fund net-of-fee return. ALPHA is the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor monthly alpha where factor loadings are estimated over the last 24
months. The primary independent variable of interest is the average facial width-to-height ratio of the fund managers in a specific role within the fund (FWHR ). Only male
managers are included in the sample. The other independent variables include fund characteristics such as management fee (MGTFEE ), performance fee (PERFFEE ), high
water mark indicator (HWM ), lock-up period in years (LOCKUP ), leverage indicator (LEVERAGE ), fund age in years (AGE ), redemption period in months (REDEMPTION ), 
and log of fund size (log(FUNDSIZE )) as well as dummy variables for year and fund investment strategy. Hedge fund managers are sorted into three groups based on their roles
within their funds: Chief Investment Officers and Portfolio Managers, who are not also Chief Executive Officers (CIO/PM), Chief Executive Officers (CEO), and all other
managers, e.g., Chief Risk Officers, Chief Operating Officers, etc (OTHERS). The t -statistics, in parentheses, are derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by fund
and month. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2015. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
CIO/PM CEO OTHERS ALL
Hedge fund manager role
